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THE FORGOTTEN EQUALITY
NORM IN IMMIGRATION
PREEMPTION: DISCRIMINATION,
HARASSMENT, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1870
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This Article explores the importance of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to the
current debate over immigration federalism and the preemption of state and local
immigration laws under the Supremacy Clause. The 1870 Act, enacted by the
Reconstruction Congress after the Civil War, prohibits discrimination on the basis
of “alienage.” The Article shows that the Act’s protections are an essential
component of the federal framework limiting sub-federal immigration laws. In
Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court found key parts of Arizona’s SB
1070 immigration enforcement act preempted. The Court focused on the federal
government’s broad authority to enforce the immigration act, to set enforcement
priorities, and to determine the terms and conditions for the admission and
expulsion of foreign nationals. The author refers to this as the “immigration
control” basis for preemption.
The Article explains that the immigration control element is important but
incomplete. That focus omits consideration of the separate and additional source
of federal primacy derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1870 that the author calls
the “immigrant equality” basis for preemption. The Article discusses the origins of
the Act’s protections, their subsequent codification, and the Supreme Court’s
reliance on the Act’s anti-discrimination mandate in immigration preemption cases
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over the course of nearly a century. The Article argues that recognizing immigrant
equality as a source of federal supremacy has significant consequences for
immigration federalism. The equality principle assesses the discriminatory
consequences of sub-federal immigration measures and draws a fundamental
distinction between measures that further immigrant equality (often referred to as
“sanctuary” ordinances) and laws that threaten to engender discrimination (like
SB 1070). The Article concludes that robust federal supremacy barring punitive
immigration enforcement laws can easily coexist with ample leeway for states and
localities to adopt immigrant protection laws that safeguard non-citizens in
municipal life.

INTRODUCTION
State and local immigration laws pit claims of federal primacy
1
against assertions of state autonomy. In Arizona v. United States, the
Supreme Court adopted a muscular view of federal immigration
supremacy to strike down essential parts of an Arizona law aimed at
Arizona’s undocumented immigrants. After a lull of many decades in
the Court’s immigration preemption jurisprudence, the Supremacy
2
Clause reemerged powerfully to limit state immigration legislation.
The Supreme Court’s displacement of state law was rooted in the
complexities of the immigration statute, Arizona’s potential intrusion
into foreign relations, and the federal government’s power to set
immigration enforcement priorities. Arizona held that central parts of
the state legislation, popularly known as SB 1070, were inconsistent
with the strictures of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and
with the enforcement discretion vested in the Executive Branch. The
Court read federal law as erecting a de facto federal ceiling on
immigration enforcement that state laws cannot exceed.
The Arizona decision recognized one element of the federal
framework governing immigrants and immigration. The Court
robustly validated the federal government’s broad authority to
enforce the immigration statutes, to set federal immigration
enforcement policies, and to determine the terms and conditions on
which foreign nationals are admitted to and expelled from the United
States. This basis for federal immigration preemption is grounded in
1. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
2. Outside the immigration-specific context, the Supremacy Clause and preemption have
featured prominently in Supreme Court decisions of recent years. For an excellent discussion,
see, for example, Ernest Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2012) (providing a comprehensive
review of preemption doctrine in the Roberts Court). My focus is limited to the scope of
preemption with respect to sub-federal immigration measures.
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notions of sovereignty and enforcement that confer vast authority on
the political branches to set immigration policy. I refer to it as the
“immigration control” or “control” component of immigration
preemption.
Absent from Arizona, however, is a second and separate ground
for limiting state immigration policies that has long served as a source
for preemption of sub-federal laws. This basis for preemption is
rooted in the longstanding federal prohibitions against state
“alienage” discrimination that require equality of treatment between
citizens and “aliens” across a wide spectrum of civic life. The source of
this federal protection is the historic Civil Rights Act of 1870 enacted
3
by the Reconstruction Congress after the Civil War. The 1870 Act
consciously outlawed discriminatory state immigration laws to protect
unpopular non-citizens of that era. Over the ensuing century, the
Supreme Court recognized the 1870 Act as an important factor in
defining the federal interests that preempt state immigration
legislation under the Supremacy Clause. I refer to this as the
“immigrant equality” or “equality” component of federal immigration
preemption.
In recent decades, the preemptive force of the 1870 Act—and of
the immigrant equality component of immigration preemption—has
been largely overlooked or forgotten. My purpose is to reinvigorate
the importance of the 1870 Act as a source for preemption of subfederal immigration measures. I believe that restoring the role of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870 is necessary to a proper understanding of the
federal framework governing immigration and immigrants—and
hence to defining the limits of immigration federalism.
The purpose of preemption is to enforce the “clear and manifest
4
purpose of Congress.” In the immigration context, the Supreme
Court has explained that the Supremacy Clause bars sub-federal
measures that “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
5
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” and that it
ensures local compliance with the country’s “overriding national
6
policies” with respect to foreign nationals. The Civil Rights Act of
3. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16–17, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
4. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)). See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64–65 (2002); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2002); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228
(2000).
5. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
6. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971). The focus here is implied preemption.
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1870 is an integral part of those national policies, and the immigrant
equality principle must stand on equal footing with other aspects of
federal law if the “full purposes and objectives” of our “overriding
national policies” are to be enforced.
Fully recognizing the immigrant equality component of the
federal framework has practical implications for the current
immigration federalism debate and gives greater normative content to
federal limits on state authority. Embracing immigrant equality as a
federal objective also helps to distinguish between two types of
contemporary sub-federal immigration measures. Those local laws
that increase discrimination against immigrants are at odds with the
immigrant equality goal, whereas those local measures that diminish
discrimination and advance immigrant integration or protection
(often confusingly referred to as “sanctuary” laws) further that
federal objective.
My claim is not that immigrant equality trumps all other
considerations or dictates the outcome of every immigration
preemption question. Rather, I argue that immigrant equality is an
essential—and forgotten—ingredient in contemporary Supremacy
Clause analysis. Courts should revitalize the equality norm in deciding
whether a particular state immigration provision impedes federal
interests or hinders federal goals. Failing to give sufficient weight to
immigrant equality leads to an impoverished conception of the
objectives of Congress in the immigration realm.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes Arizona v.
United States to illustrate how the Court’s preemption ruling rested
on an immigration control view of the federal interest. Part II
examines the basis for the immigrant equality component of federal
immigration preemption. I first explain the origins of the 1870 Civil
Rights Act’s prohibitions against sub-federal alienage discrimination.
I then review the role of the 1870 Act in the Court’s immigration
7
federalism rulings—bookended by Yick Wo v. Hopkins in 1886 and
8
Graham v. Richardson in 1971—that recognize the equality mandate
in the 1870 Act as an important ingredient in federal preemption of
state laws.
I do not address the more straightforward preemption inquiry where sub-federal regulation is
barred under an express preemption clause or as an impermissible regulation of immigration
interfering with exclusive federal power. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
7. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
8. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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In Part III, I offer some preliminary observations on how
recognition of the immigrant equality element may affect current
assessment of sub-federal laws. I argue that equality adds a ground for
preempting laws that cause discrimination and for validating
9
measures that promote immigrant integration and protection.
I. THE REEMERGENCE OF IMMIGRATION PREEMPTION: ARIZONA V.
UNITED STATES
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down three
of four contested provisions of SB 1070, Arizona’s immigration
10
enforcement law. The Court’s decision articulated a sweeping vision
of the federal immigration enforcement power—and the attendant
preemption of laws threatening to exceed it or encroach on its
11
priorities.

9. The current controversies over state and city laws have generated substantial
scholarship on “immigration federalism.” For a small sample of valuable commentary
addressing current measures, see, for example, Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251
(2011); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 2037 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration
Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007). An earlier round of scholarship
addressed issues arising from California’s Proposition 187 adopted in 1994. See, e.g., Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453 (1995);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L
L. 201 (1994); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1995); Peter J. Spiro, The
States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121 (1994). I am not
aware of any articles examining the 1870 Civil Rights Act in relation specifically to the
Supremacy Clause and immigration preemption.
10. 132 S. Ct. at 2510–11. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods
Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (West 2013).
11. For my more extensive discussion of Arizona, and its implications for state
immigration laws, see Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power:
Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Guttentag,
Immigration Preemption] (discussing the Court’s support for federal primacy in the context of
immigration enforcement). For insightful commentary on the Court’s ruling, see David Martin,
Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012). See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, The
Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); The
Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 327, 327–37 (2012). For a series of
immediate comments on the decision by numerous commentators, see Lucas Guttentag, Online
Symposium: Strong on Theory While Profiling Ignored, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2012), http:/
/www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-strong-on-theory-while-profiling-ignored/, and
related posts.
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Arizona was a facial challenge by the United States to four
elements of SB 1070. The contested sections (1) created a state crime
12
largely tracking the federal offense of failing to register as an alien;
(2) criminalized any attempt by an alien within the state to seek
13
unauthorized employment; (3) allowed state police officers to arrest
any person suspected of removability who committed a “public
14
offense”; and (4) required police to verify the immigration status of
anyone stopped for other grounds if that person was suspected of
15
being present in the country unlawfully. The last provision, Section
2B, dubbed the “show me your papers” law, incited particular criticism
from civil rights groups for inviting racial and ethnic profiling and
16
discrimination.
The Court held the first three sections preempted on the grounds
that they criminalized conduct Congress had chosen not to punish,
imposed penalties that exceeded federal levels, and required Arizona
police agencies to arrest and detain individuals whom federal
17
authorities might choose not to pursue. The Court declined to hold
Section 2B facially preempted but left open other possible challenges
18
to that provision.
The precise rationale for invalidating each section differed, but
the Court generally relied on the federal immigration statute and the
federal government’s exclusive control and discretion over
immigration enforcement decisions. The state crime for failing to
register was held preempted by the federal statute’s “full set of
standards governing alien registration,” which had been “designed as
19
a ‘harmonious whole.’” Even complementary state legislation was
unacceptable because Congress had occupied the field and because
20
Arizona’s penalties conflicted with the federal scheme. The state
12. S.B. 1070 § 3, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509.
13. S.B. 1070 § 5(C), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928.
14. S.B. 1070 § 6, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883.
15. S.B. 1070 § 2(B), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051.
16. See, e.g., SB 1070 at the Supreme Court, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.
org/whats-stake-sb-1070-supreme-court-0 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (characterizing § 2(B) as
“the most hotly disputed” part of SB 1070 and noting that it “invite[d] racial profiling”). See also
infra note 27.
17. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–07 (2012).
18. Id. at 2510.
19. Id. at 2502 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)). See also id. at 2530
(Alito, J., concurring) (finding that federal registration law constitutes “a single integrated and
all-embracing system,” representing a careful balancing of priorities (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
20. Id. at 2502–03.
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crime for engaging in unauthorized employment was held preempted
on the ground that it conflicted with Congress’s decision to adopt
comprehensive legislation regulating employers and penalizing their
hiring of unauthorized immigrant workers—and not to impose
21
criminal sanctions on the workers themselves.
The third measure, which authorized state officers to arrest,
without a warrant, any person whom the officer believed to have
committed “any public offense” that would render him or her
removable, was held preempted in significant part because the power
conferred on state officers by SB 1070 exceeded that of federal
22
officers under the INA. The Court also noted the importance of
federal enforcement discretion and pointed out that not all aliens
deemed removable are actually placed into removal proceedings. The
Court recognized that the federal government’s policy of
prosecutorial discretion “embraces immediate human concerns” and
that enforcement priorities reflect multiple considerations and
23
individual equities. The Court found a lack of federal authorization
for Arizona’s arrest law and determined that such unilateral state
authority would upend the discretion properly exercised by the
federal government, essentially “allow[ing] the state to achieve its
24
own immigration policy.” The state statute raised serious concerns
that foreign nationals exempted from enforcement under federal

21. Id. at 2504–05. The Arizona decision found federal preemption notwithstanding the
general police power of states to regulate employment recognized in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351 (1976), and the Court’s prior ruling in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968
(2011), which allowed states to revoke the licenses of businesses who knowingly hired
undocumented workers based on a close (and disputed) reading of a statutory savings clause in
the INA, id. at 1978. The Court distinguished DeCanas on the ground that although Section
5(C) aligned with the purpose of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—
sanctioning unauthorized employment—its means of enforcement did not because it
criminalized employees and thereby conflicted with Congress’s chosen approach. In Whiting, the
Court upheld a state law sanctioning businesses that knowingly employed unauthorized aliens.
Id. at 1987. The law also mandated the use of E-Verify, an electronic database used to
determine employee eligibility to work in the United States, which federal law makes optional.
The Court held that the statutory proviso to IRCA’s express preemption provision constituted a
“savings clause” that authorized Arizona’s license-based scheme. Id. The Court further held
that the federal statute regulating imposition of E-Verify applied only to the Secretary of DHS
and that the state requirement was consistent with the federal purpose. See id at 1986. With
regard to both state mandates, the Court looked to the INA and read the immigration statute as
permitting— not barring—the state law. Id.
22. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505–07. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a) (West 2013) (enumerating the
powers conferred on any officer and employee of the state that can be exercised without
requiring a warrant).
23. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
24. Id. at 2506.
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priorities would be “unnecessar[ily] harass[ed]” by local officials.
The Court did not enjoin the Section 2B provision that required
state and local police officers to verify the immigration status of
anyone they stopped if they possessed “reasonable suspicion” that the
26
person being detained was an unlawfully present alien. The Court
rejected the United States’s contention that the provision conflicted
with federal immigration law and did not engage with opponents’
concern that the law would invite discriminatory policing based on
27
racial profiling. The Court found that SB 1070 did not necessarily
conflict with federal law because state officials are authorized to
communicate with the federal government about the immigration
28
status of detained individuals. Section 2B did not interfere with
prosecutorial discretion because Arizona law did not compel the
federal government to take action against someone apprehended by
29
state authorities.
* * *
Arizona’s analytical approach involved a methodical, provisionby-provision reading of SB 1070 and the federal law governing
immigration regulation and control. The Court outlined congressional
intent in the federal immigration statute, the extent to which
enforcement control was expressly or impliedly reserved to the
federal government, the potential or actual conflict between federal
primacy and state authority, and the foreign affairs source for federal
immigration authority. The analysis turned on the breadth and
complexity of the federal legislative and regulatory framework, the
careful balance struck between federal priorities and objectives within
this framework, and the importance of discretion in immigration
25. Id. (noting that allowing state arrest “without any input from the Federal Government
about whether an arrest is warranted . . . would allow the State to achieve its own immigration
policy [and t]he result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens . . . whom federal
officials determine should not be removed”).
26. Id. at 2507–10.
27. See Brief for Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights et al. at 12, Arizona,
132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (noting that “[c]itizens of color will disproportionately bear the
burden of ‘papers please’ policing” and that “racial and ethnic perceptions w[ould] spawn the
reasonable suspicion that Section 2(B) requires”).
28. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
29. Id. at 2509. The Court further noted that “[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their
immigration status would raise constitutional concerns.” Id. As I have noted elsewhere, the
Court imposed important limits on Section 2B’s operation and explicitly noted that its ruling
“d[id] not mean to ‘foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.’” Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra
note 11, at 13–15 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510).
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enforcement. Sprinkled throughout the Arizona opinion are
30
31
32
references to the “extensive,” “comprehensive,” and “significant”
federal power over immigration.
Though the Court volubly discussed the immigration power and
its attendant preemptive force, it defined the federal interest
principally by dissecting the federal immigration laws governing
admission, expulsion, enforcement, discretion, and control, i.e., what I
refer to as the immigration control aspect of federal law. Notably
absent from the Court’s analysis was SB 1070’s potential to incite
discrimination and consideration by the Court of an immigrant
equality component of federal law. In fact, SB 1070’s potentially
discriminatory effects were affirmatively discounted at oral
33
argument.
Arizona did not address the prohibition on state “alienage”
discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1870 as a separate source for
immigration preemption. The closest the Court came to
acknowledging the relevance of the Arizona law’s potential
consequences for immigrants themselves arose in the context of the
Court’s concern that the state law could lead to harassment of foreign
34
nationals by local authorities. That in turn could impinge on
American foreign relations and thereby interfere with the federal
35
government’s authority over foreign affairs.
This aspect of the Court’s ruling is significant but incomplete. The
recognition that harassment of immigrants is an important factor to
consider means that preemption depends on more than a granular
examination of the INA and that there are federal values at stake
beyond those embedded in the immigration statutes. However, the
Court’s concern with potential harassment remained focused on
preserving the federal government’s own interests and prerogatives.
The fear of harassment of foreigners arose because it might affect the
nation’s foreign relations, not because foreign nationals themselves

30. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
31. Id. at 2502.
32. Id. at 2510.
33. At oral argument, the Chief Justice sought to cabin off any discussion of
discrimination-based arguments against SB 1070. At the beginning of his argument, Solicitor
General Verrilli was immediately asked: “No part of your argument has to do with racial or
ethnic profiling, does it?” and, “So this is not a case about ethnic profiling.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 34, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) [hereinafter Arizona Oral Argument].
34. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
35. Id.
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are protected against local discrimination as a matter of overriding
federal law. The Court’s approach omits an important aspect of its
own preemption jurisprudence that recognizes the deeper claim to
immigrant equality stemming from the Civil Rights Act of 1870.
II. ALIENS, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND RECONSTRUCTION
For nearly a century after adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1870,
the Supreme Court recognized the principle of immigrant equality as
part of the federal framework that preempted state or local laws
denying rights, protections, and benefits to non-citizens. The 1870 Act,
passed by the Reconstruction Congress, contained express and
enduring provisions to protect foreign nationals—“aliens”—against
36
discrimination. These protections form a central part of federal
policy regarding immigrants and immigration that should be taken
into account in contemporary Supremacy Clause analysis. Beginning
with Yick Wo v. Hopkins in 1886 and continuing for nearly ninety
years through its landmark decision in Graham v. Richardson in 1971,
the Supreme Court recognized the equality principle embodied in the
Civil Rights Act of 1870 for its contribution to the preemption of state
37
and local immigration measures. As the Supremacy Clause now
reemerges after a lengthy hiatus to serve as a critical limit on state
immigration authority, restoring the significance of the 1870 Act in the
federal immigration framework is essential.
The key provision of the 1870 Act provides in relevant part that
“all persons” shall have the same right as “white citizens” in “every
38
State and Territory” to certain enumerated rights. That law is now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It is part of the larger federal framework
adopted by Congress in 1870 specifically intended to protect
non-citizens against sub-federal discrimination. At that time,
Congress’s focus was particularly on the treatment of Chinese
immigrants in California, but the Act applied broadly to all noncitizens. Over the years, the Supreme Court invoked the protections
of the 1870 Act in preempting discriminatory state and local welfare,
business, and registration laws that targeted immigrants. The

36. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16–17, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). I use the term “alien” throughout this Article to reflect the usage in the
case law and the text of the 1870 Act.
37. See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 16.
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prohibition against discrimination featured prominently in key
immigration preemption cases across many decades. The Court
understood the mandate of non-discrimination as part of the broader
national policy governing the treatment and rights of non-citizens in
the United States. This Part first recounts the evolution of the 1870
Act and traces the alien anti-discrimination provisions from their
origins through their current codification. I then review the Supreme
Court’s recognition of the alienage provisions in the 1870 Act as an
important component of the federal framework preempting state and
local immigration laws.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1870 and the Protection of Aliens
The origins of the alien-protection sections of the Civil Rights Act
of 1870 confirm the Act’s intent to limit state discrimination against
foreign nationals. The law’s subsequent codification helps explain why
these protections may today be overlooked in defining the federal
scheme that sets limits on state and local authority.
Reconstruction and the civil rights statutes of that era are, of
39
course, the subject of vast scholarship. But, the fact that this historic
civil rights legislation also contained important provisions prohibiting
alienage discrimination and protecting immigrants has not been as
widely explained. The origins and evolution of the law’s alienprotecting elements are not fully set forth in the Supreme Court’s
40
cases. Some scholars have told important aspects of the story as it
39. E.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION (2002); PETER CAMEJO, RACISM,
REVOLUTION, REACTION, 1861-1877: THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION
(1976); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877
(2002); EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2003); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY:
THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (2012); KENNETH
M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION (1965). These works do not focus on the alienage
discrimination prohibitions of the 1870 Act or on the development of the Act’s particular
immigrant-related provisions.
40. I am not aware of any case in which the Court has traced in detail all of the provisions
in the 1870 Act protecting aliens against discrimination. The Court has examined the origins of
one key part, Section 16 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981), in relation to race discrimination
claims in various cases. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008)
(holding that § 1981 as amended applies to retaliation claims); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (holding that § 1981 only prohibits intentional
discrimination); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (holding that
§ 1981 reaches private discrimination against white persons); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
172 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to discriminatory admission practices of private schools);
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948) (holding that Section 16 prohibits enforcement of
restrictive racial covenants); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77–79 (1917) (holding that
Section 16 contravened a racially discriminatory municipal ordinance). With the exception of
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41

relates to discrimination against Chinese immigrants, but their work
does not examine the centrality of the 1870 Act in the particular
context of immigration federalism and federal preemption of state
42
alienage laws. Revisiting the origins, text, and codification of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870 helps illuminate the Act as an important
source for understanding federal policies and interests regarding
immigrants and immigration.
1. Enactment During Reconstruction
a. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Exploring the federal prohibitions against state alienage
discrimination begins with the Civil Rights Acts of 1866. The 1866 Act,
which itself addressed only race and citizenship, is the essential
starting point because it enacted a template that became the model
for addressing alienage discrimination a few years later.
The Thirty-Ninth Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866
43
(in April 1866 over President Johnson’s veto) to enforce the rights of
newly freed slaves under the recently-ratified Thirteenth
44
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was considered by the

the cases I discuss in the text, the Court has addressed the 1870 Act’s application to alienage
discrimination only indirectly. See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 193–204 (White, J., dissenting)
(noting, in consideration of the legislative history, that “one of the classes of persons for whose
benefit the statute was intended was aliens”); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 n.10
(1941) (explaining, in discussing another section, that the claimed purpose “was to extend [the
Civil Rights Act’s] benefits to aliens”).
41. See CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994); Charles McClain, Jr.,
The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984). See also Stephen Knight, The First Time as Tragedy, The Second
Time as Farce: Proposition 187, Section 1981 and the Rights of Aliens, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
289 (1997). See generally GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY:
THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 80–83 (2013).
42. My analysis considers the existing historical sources and scholarship to examine the
importance of the 1870 Act in relation to the contemporary debate over immigration federalism
and preemption. I do not undertake an independent examination of the history of the alienage
provisions in the 1870 Act or the motivations of its proponents. For now, my purpose is simply
to show the significance of the alien-protection provisions specifically to preemption. My initial
thoughts appear in Guttentag, Discrimination, supra note ∗. The existing literature on the 1870
Act’s prohibition against alienage discrimination focuses on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 without
considering its relevance to federal preemption. See, e.g., Aaron Danzinger, The Scope of 42
U.S.C. § 1981: Protection Against Private Alien Age Discrimination, 11 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 527
(1997); Angela M. Ford, Private Alienage Discrimination and the Reconstruction Amendments:
The Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 457 (2001); Knight, supra note 41.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 29.
44. See CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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same Congress and approved for submission to the states that June,
45
but it was not ratified until July 1868.
The key parts of the 1866 Act for present purposes are the second
clause of Section 1 and the entirety of Section 2. In Section 1,
Congress first ensured citizenship for all persons born in the United
46
States. The second clause of Section 1 then mandated equality
between white and non-white citizens with respect to a range of civil
47
and economic rights enumerated in the statute. It required that
“all . . . citizens” be treated the same as “white citizens” in designated
respects. Section 2 then further addressed racial discrimination by
imposing criminal penalties for deprivation of rights or disparate
punishments based on race or prior condition of slavery or
48
involuntary servitude. That provision imposed a fine and
45. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148–49 (1866); Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat.
708, 711 (July 28, 1868). As scholars and the Court have long noted, the 1866 Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment are closely intertwined. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31–33 (1948)
(showing how the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment “were closely related both in
inception and in the objectives which Congress sought to achieve”); HORACE EDGAR FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94–97 (photo. reprint 1965) (1908)
(arguing that a primary reason for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to set the
1866 Act on more solid constitutional footing).
46. The first clause of Section 1 addressed citizenship in language very similar to that in
the later Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, cl. 1 (“Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians, not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”), with U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). See
generally GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006) (describing the “battle” over
the Fourteenth Amendment and how the Amendment changed the country).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, cl. 2. The first clause of Section 1 provided:
[A]nd such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. at cl. 1.
48. Id. § 2. The full text of Section 2 of the 1866 Act read:
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or
protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or
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imprisonment (up to a year) on any person who, under color of law or
custom, deprived any inhabitant of enumerated rights or imposed
“punishments, pains or penalties” different than on a “white person[]”
because of a person’s former slave status or “by reason of his color or
49
race.”
b. The 1870 Act
In May 1870, Congress enacted further civil rights legislation. The
Voting Rights Enforcement Act, commonly referred to as the
50
Enforcement Act of 1870 or the Civil Rights Act of 1870, was
adopted after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had come
51
into force (in July 1868 and February 1870, respectively). The 1870
Act, although largely focused on voting rights, contained three distinct
substantive provisions aimed at discrimination against non-citizens.
The key protections appeared in Sections 16 and 17. These were
modified versions of Sections 1 and 2 of the recently-adopted 1866
Act. But the new statutes were expanded to encompass discrimination
against non-citizens, i.e., “alienage” discrimination.
The “Alien” Provisions—Sections 16 and 17. Sections 16 and 17
of the 1870 Act enacted a broad measure of equality between citizens
52
and aliens in “every State and Territory.” These provisions (along
with what became Section 18) originated in a separate bill, S.365,
53
introduced in 1870 by Senator William Morris Stewart of Nevada.

by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both,
in the discretion of the court.
Id.
49. Id. The remaining sections of the 1866 Act enforced its principal provisions but did not
directly bear on later developments protecting non-citizens. Sections 3 through 10 addressed
enforcement and jurisdictional issues. Section 3 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the federal
courts; Section 4 gave enforcement powers to United States attorneys and marshals; Section 5
imposed certain duties on those officers to execute warrants; Section 6 made it a crime to
interfere with the officers’ duties; Section 7 provided payment to the officers; Section 8 allowed
the President to assign officers to locations where they were needed; Section 9 authorized the
President to deploy military forces to enforce the Act; and Section 10 provided for Supreme
Court review. Id. §§ 3–10.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (“An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens
of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other Purposes.”).
51. FLACK, supra note 45, at 223–24.
52. Civil Rights Act of 1870 §§ 16–17.
53. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 323 (1870) (introducing S.365). Justice White
refers to S.365 in his Runyon dissent, but focuses on what became Section 16 of the 1870 Act.
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195–201 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (citing S.365 in
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Stewart’s stated purpose for S.365 was to extend the protections of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to aliens: “The original [1866] civil rights
bill protected all persons born in the United States in the equal
protection of the laws. This bill extends it to aliens, so that all persons
who are in the United States shall have the equal protection of our
54
laws.” Stewart’s original bill had three sections, which were
subsequently inserted virtually verbatim into the bill that became the
55
Civil Rights Act of 1870. Stewart was particularly concerned with
addressing the discrimination and abuse visited upon Chinese
nationals in California and the West: “If the State courts do not give
them the equal protection of the law, if public sentiment is so
inhuman as to rob them of their ordinary civil rights, . . . I would be

noting the origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
54. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
55. See id. (recording the text of the Stewart Bill). The entirety of S.365 provided:
Be it enacted, &c., That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, Indians
not taxed excepted, shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. No tax or
charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person emigrating thereto
from a foreign country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every person
emigrating to such State from any other foreign country, and any law of any State in
conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant
of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this
act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person being an
alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white
persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April 9,
1866, is hereby reenacted, and said act, except the first and second sections thereof, is
hereby referred to and made a part of this act.
Id. S.365 had been progressing separately since January 10, 1870 until Senator Stewart proposed
it as an amendment to the voting rights bill in May of 1870. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 323 (1870) (introducing S.365). See also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3480 (1870)
(showing the movement to amend the voting rights bill to add S.365). Between Stewart’s
introduction and passage of the 1870 Act, a few modest changes in the language of the
provisions occurred. The original S.365 introduced by Senator Stewart excluded “Indians not
taxed” from the protections of Section 1, but that stipulation was omitted when S.365 was made
a part of the 1870 Act. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870), with Civil
Rights Act of 1870 § 16. The criminal provision forbidding differential punishment for aliens
and “white persons” was modified to forbid differential punishment for aliens and “citizens.”
Compare CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870), with Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17.
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less than a man if I did not insist . . . that that provision shall go on
56
this bill.”
The two alienage provisions of the 1870 Act provided as follows:
[Section 16:] [A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding. No tax or charge shall be imposed or
enforced by any State upon any person immigrating thereto from a
foreign country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon
every person immigrating to such State from any other foreign
country; and any law of any State in conflict with this provision is
57
hereby declared null and void.
[Section 17:] And be it further enacted, That any person who,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State
or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by
the last preceding section of this act, or to different punishment,
pains, or penalties on account of such person being an alien, or by
reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of
citizens, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the

56. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart). See also
id. at 3807 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“I congratulate the country, particularly [for] those
provisions which extend the strong arm of the Government to the protection of the Chinese;
those provisions which protect those industrious, helpless people whom we have invited to our
shores . . . .”). The story of Senator Stewart, his goal of addressing discrimination against
Chinese immigrants in California, the evolution of S.365, its inclusion in the Voting Rights Act,
and the role of the San Francisco Chinese community in pursuing this legislation are recounted
in fascinating detail by Charles McClain. MCCLAIN, supra note 41. See generally LUCY E.
SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). To acknowledge Stewart’s role in sponsoring these protections is
not to express a view on his motivation. McClain recognizes a confluence of interests between
the Chinese who sought to protect themselves against discrimination and the “Caucasian
business community” that viewed them as a source of labor. McClain, Jr., supra note 41, at 534
n.22 (1984) (“Some evidence suggests that Chinese community leaders saw some, though by no
means all, leaders of the Caucasian business community as natural allies and worked with them
when that appeared to inure to their own benefit.”).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 16.
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58

discretion of the court.

First Sentence of Section 16. The first sentence of Section 16 is the
most well-known of the Act’s provisions. Today it is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981. The language of Section 16 was patterned directly on
Section 1 of the 1866 Act with a critical difference. The new Section
16 provided that “all persons” (instead of only “citizens”) be treated
59
the same as “white citizens.” It thereby went significantly beyond
prohibiting discrimination between white and non-white citizens. By
requiring equality between persons and citizens, Section 16
prohibited discrimination on the basis of citizenship, or as it came to
be called, on the basis of alienage.
Section 16 differed in two other notable respects from the earlier
1866 Act with regard to the particular areas of non-discrimination
listed in the statute. Section 16 added “taxes, licenses and exactions”
to the list of activities for which discrimination was barred, and the
law omitted the right “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
60
real and personal property” from its coverage. In short, the effect of
Section 16 was to prohibit discrimination both on the basis of alienage
(persons versus white citizens) and on the basis of race (persons
versus white citizens) as to the lengthy list of civil and economic rights
specified in the law, but with the important exception of property
rights.
Discrimination with regard to property rights continued to be
prohibited by the earlier Section 1 from the 1866 Act. But that section
governed property discrimination only for citizens and only with
61
respect to race. Alienage discrimination was not encompassed by the

58. Id. § 17.
59. Id. § 16.
60. Compare id. § 16 (encompassing the right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and also mandating that
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States “be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other” (emphasis added)), with
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, cl. 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (encompassing the right “to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and also mandating that all
citizens “be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other” (emphasis
added)). See also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart)
(“If the Senator will examine this bill in connection with the original civil rights bill, he will see
that it has no reference to inheriting or holding real estate.”).
61. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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earlier law, and hence aliens were not entitled to equality as to
62
property rights under the statute.
Second Sentence of Section 16. The second sentence of Section 16
was also directly addressed at discriminatory practices affecting noncitizens—but with the particular aim of preventing state
discrimination among different immigrant groups. The provision
prohibited any state from imposing or enforcing any tax or charge on
any person immigrating to the state from a foreign country if that tax
was not “equally imposed” on every person immigrating “from any
63
other foreign country.”
Section 17. Section 17 of the 1870 Act imposed criminal penalties
for alienage discrimination by enacting language that closely tracked
but significantly expanded the criminal prohibitions originally
enacted by Section 2 of the 1866 Act. The 1866 Act had criminalized
the differential imposition of “punishment, pains, or penalties” based
64
on “color or race” or prior slavery. The new law explicitly expanded
the scope of the prohibition by also outlawing differential treatment
65
“on account of such person being an alien.”
In addition, Section 17 changed the category of persons whose
treatment set the equality baseline to which others were entitled. The
1866 Act provided that others be treated the same as “white
66
persons.” Section 17 instead required that everyone be treated

62. The omission regarding property equality under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 may help
to explain the subsequent general acceptance of state laws discriminating against non-citizens in
land inheritance and ownership in the era before Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366–68
(1971). See infra note 106 (discussing property discrimination cases).
63. See supra text accompanying note 57. This provision has been largely forgotten as it
was repealed in 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 403(a)(1), 66
Stat. 163, 279 (1952) (repealing the tax provision of Section 16).
64. Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2.
65. Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 58.
The Supreme Court has read this section as authorizing punishment of anyone for either
“willfully subjecting any inhabitant to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution” or
for “willfully subjecting any inhabitant to different punishments on account of his color or race
[or alienage] than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens.” United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 327 (1941).
66. Both Section 2 (from 1866) and Section 17 (from 1870) referred to every “inhabitant”
of any “State or Territory” being protected against deprivation of rights on account of any such
“person” being an alien or by reason of his color. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2, with
Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17. I am not aware of any congressional discussion of the reason for
using the term “inhabitant.” The term also appears in the earlier laws restricting immigration
from China (and later extended) presumably to broaden the scope of the restriction. See infra
note 78. As noted below, these terms were changed in the 1875 codification and again in 1994 by
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equally with “citizens.” The statute thus juxtaposed all persons (or
inhabitants) with citizens thereby underscoring that discriminatory
67
treatment of non-citizens was impermissible.
Section 18. Section 18 reenacted the entire Civil Rights Act of
1866 and specified that Sections 16 and 17 (the alienage provisions)
68
“be enforced pursuant to the provisions of said act.”
In sum, the 1870 Act enumerated specified rights and commanded
equality between citizens and non-citizens, outlawed differential entry
taxes based on nationality or country of origin, and imposed criminal
penalties for subjecting a person to discriminatory punishment “on
account of . . . being an alien.” Congress expressly barred
discrimination between citizens and aliens using the same categorical
language that it had initially deployed to condemn discrimination
based on race or color in the 1866 Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1870
thus enacted an emphatic federal prohibition against alienage
discrimination by states in critical areas of public life.
2. The Subsequent Codification
Between the adoption of the Act in 1870 and today’s codification
of its provisions, the protections for non-citizens that Congress
enacted have appeared in different titles and chapters of the federal
code. This process, and the disaggregation of the 1870 Act into
separate statutes, has somewhat obscured the Act’s importance to
69
immigration discrimination and its relevance to federal preemption.

congressional amendment. See infra notes 81 and 84 and accompanying text.
67. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2, with Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17. Section 17
also omitted the earlier reference to previous condition of slavery (perhaps because that was
assumed to be encompassed in the race and color protection).
68. Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 18. Section 18 reads in its entirety:
And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and
seventeen hereof shall be enforced according to the provisions of said act.
Id. Scholars assume that the reenactment was intended to ensure that the 1866 Act was
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Thirteenth to address concerns about
the earlier law’s constitutionality. See FLACK, supra note 45, at 224; George Rutherglen, The
Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 313
(2003); Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and
Antidiscrimination for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 188 (2006). No
rationale is presented in the debates, however. See FLACK, supra note 45, at 224 (“[I]t is strange
that no reference was made as to this purpose.”). The Thirteenth Amendment foundation for
Section 16 supported its application to private discrimination. See infra notes 72 and 172.
69. A schematic flow chart depicting the origins and codifications appears infra at pp. 26.
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a. 1875 Revised Statutes
Soon after the 1870 Act, a codification of federal law occurred.
70
The Revised Statutes of 1875 synthesized and consolidated the
federal laws enacted by Congress into a comprehensive collection for
71
the first time. This has particular relevance because elements of
Sections 1 and 2 of the 1866 Act and of Sections 16 and 17 of the 1870
72
Act were combined in the codification process. After this 1875
codification, the location of the different statutes changed over the
years, but the operative language of the key provisions (relating to the
aspects at issue here) remained largely unaltered, with a few
exceptions that are detailed below.
In the 1875 codification, the overlapping prohibitions enacted in
Section 1 of the 1866 Act and reenacted more expansively by the first
sentence of Section 16 of the 1870 Act were codified in the “Civil
73
Rights” title of the Revised Statutes. The core requirement of
equality between “persons” and “white citizens” (with regard to
enumerated rights) established by Section 16 became Revised
74
75
Statutes Section 1977. That language has remained intact ever since.
70. This codification is often referred to as the “Revised Statutes of 1874.” I have chosen
to use “Revised Statutes of 1875” following the date of publication (rather than enactment) of
the original edition. See Hamilton Fish, Certification of THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE
UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1875). This comports with the naming system of the Library of
Congress, Federal Statutes: Subject Arrangement of Statutes, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2013), as well as some other publications,
e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 41, at 68 (1996); DAVID SCHULTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
LAW 443 (2009); RICHARD STEVEN STREET, BEASTS OF THE FIELD: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
OF CALIFORNIA FARM WORKERS, 1769-1913 349 (2004).
71. See Roy G. Fitzgerald, Preface to THE CODE OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1926).
72. This has engendered controversy over the constitutional foundations of the provisions
and the intentional or inadvertent consequences of the codification process. There is
disagreement over whether § 1981 was grounded in the 1866 Act to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment—thereby reaching private conduct—or only in the 1870 Act pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby limited to state action. Compare Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (stating that § 1981 “constitutes an exercise of federal legislative power
under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment”), with Runyon, 427 U.S. at 205–07 (White, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that § 1981 derives only from the 1870 Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment). That disagreement has been superseded by the amendments enacted by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and, in any case, does not matter for the essential point here: that Congress
intended to protect aliens, at a minimum, against discriminatory state laws. See infra note 172.
73. Revised Statutes, tit. 24, §§ 1977–78, 18 Stat. 1, 348 (1874).
74. Id. § 1977.
75. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2013) (using the same language as Section 1977). Section
1977 of the Revised Statutes provided:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
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The requirement of racial equality for all citizens with regard to
property rights appeared only in Section 1 of the 1866 Act. It was
culled from the 1866 Act language and separately codified in Section
76
1978, immediately adjacent to the codification of Section 16.
The second sentence of Section 16 (from 1870), which prohibited
discrimination among aliens in state landing taxes based on country of
origin, was codified in an entirely different location under the
77
“Immigration” title at Section 2164. It appeared alongside provisions
of the so-called “Anti-Coolie Act,” which restricted the entry of
certain Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian immigrants into the
78
United States. This underscores the broader point that federal law
simultaneously authorized federal classifications while outlawing state
discrimination on the same or similar grounds.
The third prohibition in the 1870 Act—Section 17’s criminalizing
of discrimination against persons on account of race, color, or “being
an alien”—was combined with other enactments and codified at
79
Section 5510 as part of the “Crimes” title. Although Section 5510
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Revised Statutes § 1977. Later amendments added provisions to the statute but did not alter this
text.
76. Revised Statutes § 1978. Section 1978 provided: “All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Id. Today that
provision is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
77. See id. § 2164 (codifying the second sentence of Section 16). Section 2164 provided:
“No tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person immigrating
thereto from a foreign country, which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every person
immigrating to such State from any other foreign country.” Id.
78. See id. §§ 2158–63 (showing sections derived from An Act to prohibit the ‘Coolie
Trade’ by American Citizens in American Vessels, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862)). The 1862 “AntiCoolie” Act initially applied only to “inhabitants or subjects of China.” An Act to prohibit the
‘Coolie Trade’ § 1. It was amended in 1869 to extend to “Japan or any other oriental country.”
Act of Feb. 9, 1869, ch. 24, 15 Stat. 269 (1869). See generally infra note 187.
79. See Revised Statutes § 5510. The marginalia to Section 5510 in the Revised Statutes
state that the section was derived from Section 17 of the 1870 Act. Section 5510 is probably
more properly considered an amalgamation of criminal provisions of the 1866 Act, the 1870 Act,
and the 1871 “Ku Klux Klan” Act, as the Supreme Court has suggested. See Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1945) (noting the various historical sources of the law). Section 5510
criminalizes, in addition to conduct proscribed in Section 17, the deprivation of “privileges, or
immunities” secured by the “Constitution and laws of the United States,” which had been
prohibited by the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13,
13 (“[A]ny person who . . . shall subject . . . any person within the jurisdiction of the United
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States . . . shall . . . be liable” to the injured party (emphasis added)).
Representative Lawrence stated quite explicitly that the statute as proposed in Thomas
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largely followed the language of its sources, the codifiers changed the
80
phrase “on account of such person being an alien” to “on account of
such an inhabitant being an alien,” tracking the use of “inhabitant”
81
earlier in the same section. The change was presumptively non82
substantive and presumably intended for symmetry. But courts
nonetheless scrutinized the use of “inhabitant” in later years (and
83
applied it broadly). In 1994 Congress changed both instances of
“inhabitant” to “person” to remove any doubt about the
84
expansiveness of its coverage.
In sum, by 1875, the various overlapping and distinct elements of
Sections 1 and 2 (from 1866) and Sections 16 and 17 (from 1870) were
codified into four separate statutes:
• Most of Section 1 (from 1866) and Section 16 (from 1870)
appeared in Section 1977, requiring equality of specified
rights between persons and white citizens (the alien nondiscrimination provision).
• The original portion of Section 1 (from 1866) addressing
property rights of citizens—that was not encompassed by
Section 16 (from 1870)—was codified separately in Section
1978 (the citizen property discrimination provision).

Jefferson Durant’s revision, which was ultimately adopted verbatim, “condenses into one the
three criminal sections” of the 1866, 1870, and 1871 Acts. 2 CONG. REC. 828 (1874).
80. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (emphasis added).
81. Revised Statutes § 5510 (emphasis added).
82. Any substantive change to the law would have run counter to the professed aim of the
codifiers. See 2 CONG. REC. 129 (1873) (statement of Rep. Butler) (“We have not attempted to
change the law, in a single word or letter, so as to make a different reading or different sense.
All that has been done is to strike out the obsolete parts and to condense and consolidate and
bring together statutes in pari materia . . . .”).
83. For example, courts of appeals analyzed the term in determining the extent to which
the statute might protect unlawfully present aliens. See United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232,
243 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the presence of an “illegal alien” “was sufficiently permanent
for her to qualify as an inhabitant under the statute”); United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216,
227 (1st Cir. 1990) (“We can understand how one might bring an ‘illegal alien,’ intending to stay
in the country for some time, within the scope of the word ‘inhabitant.’”); United States v.
Otherson, 637 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he term ‘inhabitant’ as used in [S]ection 242
does include all persons, without exception, present within the jurisdiction of the United
States.”).
84. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320201(b)(2), 108 Stat. 1796 (striking references to “inhabitant” and inserting the term
“person”); cf. 137 CONG. REC. 3191 (1991) (indicating that the intent of the change from
“inhabitant” to “person” was “to ensure protection of all persons within the United States by
these important provisions of the federal civil rights laws, regardless of whether they are
‘inhabitants’”).
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The second sentence of Section 16 (from 1870) prohibiting
discriminatory landing taxes appeared in Section 2164 (the
landing tax provision).
The expanded criminal provision of Section 17 (from
1870) prohibiting differential punishment on account of a
person’s “being an alien,” and encompassing the former
Section 2 (from 1866) (as well elements of the 1871 Ku
85
Klux Klan Act) appeared in Section 5510 (the criminal
alien discrimination provision).

b. Later Changes: 1926 Codifications
Over the next seventy-five years, the statutes eventually settled
into their present location. Of particular interest, from 1926 until 1952
the alien non-discrimination provision codified at Section 1977 (from
Section 16) appeared as part of the “Aliens and Citizenship”
86
immigration laws in Title 8 of the United States Code.
In 1926, the publication of the United States Code placed Section
1977 (prohibiting alienage discrimination) among the immigration
laws at 8 U.S.C. § 41. The related Section 1978 (protecting property
rights for citizens) was kept adjacent and codified at 8 U.S.C. § 42. The
two sections were a part of the “Civil Rights” chapter of the Aliens
87
and Citizenship Title 8. Both provisions remained a part of the
Immigration title for more than a quarter-century.
The 1926 reorganization also renumbered the landing tax
provision; what was once in Section 16, and then codified at Section
2164 in 1875, became Section 135 under the “Aliens and Citizenship”
88
title in the “Immigration” chapter. It was later repealed in 1952 by
89
the INA, which rendered that section superfluous.
85. See supra note 79 (discussing the roots of Section 5510).
86. In 1926, the United States Code was published (prepared by private publishers under
the supervision of House and Senate committees). See Fitzgerald, supra note 71 (“Under the
auspices of the committees of the House and the Senate the actual work of assembling and
classifying the mass of material has been done by the West Publishing Co. and the Edward
Thompson Co.”).
87. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 41–43 (1926) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83). Today’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 appeared at 8 U.S.C. § 43, and was previously Section 1979 of the Revised
Statutes, which derived from Section 1 of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See supra note 79. See
also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 204 (1961) (tracing the origins of the provision).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 135 (1926) (repealed 1952) (incorporating the landing tax provision).
89. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 403(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 279
(1952) (repealing Section 135). The 1952 notes to Title 8 explain that Section 135 was now
covered in subchapter II of chapter 12, which contained provisions of the new INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 135 (1926) (repealed 1952) (showing the relocation).
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Lastly, the 1926 codification moved the criminal provisions
(originating in Section 17 of the 1870 Act) codified at Section 5510 in
90
1875, to Section 52 of Title 18, the Crimes title. Unlike the other
sections, it had undergone an interim move in 1909 to section 20 of
91
the Federal Penal Code. In 1948, Section 52 was renumbered as
92
Section 242, where it remains today.
c. 1952
The most recent changes in the statutes’ locations occurred in
93
1952 when Congress enacted the INA. That overhaul of federal
immigration law prompted further reorganization of the United
States Code. The two civil rights provisions derived from the 1866 and
1870 Acts were moved out of the Immigration title (Title 8) and into
the Health and Welfare title (Title 42). They became, respectively, 42
94
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, where they have remained ever since.
* * *
The chart below schematically portrays the evolving placement of
the 1870 Act’s immigration provisions culminating in the current
codification of Sections 16 and 17 at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 18 U.S.C. §
242.
The disaggregation, fragmentation, and transient codification of
the protections for non-citizens in the 1870 Act that began with the
1875 codification process and continued with the subsequent
scattering of the various provisions through the United States Code
may help explain why the Supreme Court gradually lost sight of the
broader significance of the 1870 Act as a whole. The codification
process separated the parts of the Act from each other thereby
diminishing the more encompassing nature of Senator Stewart’s
original bill and the relevant provisions of the 1870 Act. Section 17

90. See 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1926) (repealed 1948).
91. See Penal Code of 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1088, 1092.
92. See Act of Jan. 6, 1948, ch. 645, § 242, 62 Stat. 683, 696; 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1926)
(repealed 1948) (containing the same content).
93. Immigration and Nationality Act.
94. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 41–43 (1952) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83) (indicating
transfer); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981–82 (West 2013) (containing the same content). The legislative
sources do not reveal a reason for the shift in location. In 1991, § 1981 underwent a final
significant substantive expansion to clarify the reach of the term “make and enforce contracts”
and to specify that the statute covered non-governmental private discrimination as well as
action under color of state law. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105
Stat. 1071. See generally CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008) (recounting
enactment of 1991 Civil Rights Act amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
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(which criminalized forms of alienage discrimination) and the nowrepealed landing tax prohibition became separated from the nondiscrimination provision of Section 16, obscuring their shared history
and broader goal of equality.
In addition, the central protections of Section 16 disappeared from
the Immigration title when they were moved in 1952. After the
codification of 1926, when the discrimination prohibition appeared in
the federal scheme regulating—and protecting—immigrants, the
immigration nexus was more immediately apparent. Transferring
Section 16 out of the Immigration title of the Code in 1952 may have
eventually clouded its origins as part of a broader framework that
Congress enacted along with Section 17 to protect non-citizens
against state alienage discrimination.
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B. The Court’s Immigration Preemption Decisions and the 1870 Act
For many decades following the enactment of the 1870 Civil
Rights Act, the Supreme Court recognized the Act as a component of
the federal structure that protects immigrants against state
discrimination. The Court consciously invoked the Act in defining the
federal law and federal interests that preempted state measures under
the Supremacy Clause. The Act’s provisions informed the Court’s
understanding of the broad federal framework governing the rights of
immigrants and barring inconsistent state laws. The principal rulings
in which the Court recognized Section 16 as part of a comprehensive
federal scheme regulating and protecting aliens are Yick Wo v.
95
Hopkins, Hines v. Davidowitz, Takahashi v. California Fish & Game
96
Commission, and Graham v. Richardson.
The 1870 Act first played a prominent role in defining the scope of
federal law with the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins. In Yick Wo,
the Court struck down sub-federal restrictions on aliens on the
ground—for the first time—that the laws constituted impermissible
97
discrimination. The case famously held that San Francisco laundry
ordinances, although neutral on their face, discriminated
impermissibly against Chinese immigrants in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment because “in their administration” they were
98
“applied and administered” with “an evil eye and unequal hand.”
The Court prominently relied on the 1870 Civil Rights Act in
99
support of its ruling. Although it recognized that plaintiffs were
100
“aliens and subjects of the emperor of China,”
the Court
nonetheless found that they were within the protections of the

95. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
96. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
97. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). Before Yick Wo, the Court had struck
down some sub-federal laws governing foreign nationals on the ground that they constituted
impermissible regulation of immigration. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277, 280–81
(1875) (holding that a California statute imposing state fees to control entry of paupers,
criminals, and other undesirable immigrants constituted unconstitutional regulation of
immigration); Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (invalidating a similar
New York statute on the same grounds). The Court had also upheld other laws as permissible
exercises of local power. See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 707, 711 (1885) (holding that a
San Francisco ordinance limiting working hours in laundries was a valid exercise of police
power); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 (1884) (holding that a related San Francisco
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power).
98. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74.
99. Id. at 369.
100. Id. at 368.
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101

Constitution—and of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. The Court recited
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and affirmed that “[t]hese provisions are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
102
without regard to any difference of race, of color, or of nationality.”
The Court went on to quote the key protection of Section 16 of the
1870 Act (by then codified at Section 1977):
It is accordingly enacted by section 1977 of the Revised Statutes
that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right, in every state and territory, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
103
exactions of every kind, and to no other.”

The Court strongly emphasized the equality principle embedded
in the Act. It stressed that under the law the “rights of every citizen”
must be viewed “equally with those of the strangers and aliens”
104
seeking the Court’s protection. The Court ultimately ruled that the
law was based on “hostility to the race and nationality” of the
105
plaintiffs, violating equal protection. But the opinion laid the
foundation for the 1870 Act’s preeminence with regard to alienage
discrimination.
In subsequent cases, Yick Wo’s understanding about the scope and
importance of the 1870 Civil Rights Act became central when the
Court considered immigration preemption and the protection
afforded by federal law. The language from Yick Wo and the
invocation of Section 16 appeared in key cases where the Court
106
struck down state laws solely on federal preemption grounds.
101. Id. at 369.
102. Id. (emphasis added). See also id. (“The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is
not confined to the protection of citizens.”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 374.
106. After Yick Wo, the Court considered a number of cases challenging state or local laws
discriminating on the basis of alienage without considering Section 16. Most of these cases
concerned inheritance or ownership of real property, an area specifically carved out of Section
16 of the 1870 Act. Those restrictions were permitted unless the Court found them prohibited
by treaty or as discriminating against United States citizens (not aliens) based on nationality.
Compare Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 261–63 (1925) (upholding the discriminatory
presumption created by the California Alien Land Law), and Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197, 223–24 (1923) (upholding the Washington Alien Land Law, which restricted alien land
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In Hines v. Davidowitz, which Arizona cites prominently, the
108
Court invalidated a Pennsylvania alien registration law. Hines
concerned Pennsylvania’s 1939 law requiring aliens to register
109
annually and to provide specified information to the state. The
plaintiffs claimed that the state law conflicted with a number of
constitutional rights and federal provisions, including Section 16 of
110
the 1870 Act (by then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 41).
The Court expressly left open all other claims and ruled only on
111
the plaintiffs’ federal preemption claim. The opinion concluded that
the state law was preempted by the recently enacted federal
112
registration regime. In doing so, the Court, with Justice Black
ownership), and Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding the California Alien
Land Law, which restricted alien land ownership), and Petersen v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170, 175
(1917) (upholding a discriminatory Iowa inheritance tax), and Duus v. Brown, 245 U.S. 176,
177–78 (1917) (same), with Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 636, 644–47 (1948) (holding a
state land restriction unconstitutional as applied to an American citizen born to Japanese
parents), and Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 57–58 (1929) (holding that a treaty with Denmark
rendered Iowa’s inheritance tax on Danish citizen unlawful), and De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258, 272–73 (1890) (holding that a treaty with France rendered the District of Columbia’s
restriction on French citizen’s inheritance unlawful). Other cases were decided under the Equal
Protection Clause (without mention of preemption or the 1870 Civil Rights Act) under the thenprevailing view that public goods, employment, and resources could be reserved to United
States citizens. See, e.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 176–77, 194 (1915) (upholding a New
York law restricting public works hiring to citizens); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198
(1915) (upholding a law criminalizing the hiring of aliens for public works); Patsone v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143–45 (1914) (upholding a law forbidding aliens from owning a
shotgun or rifle and from “kill[ing] any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or
property”). Interference with private employment was struck down on equal protection
grounds. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40–43 (1915) (holding unconstitutional an
Arizona law imposing a general quota on the employment of lawfully admitted aliens). In Ohio
v. Deckerbach, the Court upheld an Ohio law prohibiting aliens from operating pool halls, areas
known for vice and corruption, as “rational” without mention of Section 16. 274 U.S. 392, 397
(1927). In 1971, Graham v. Richardson revolutionized the level of scrutiny applicable to state
alienage discrimination, rendering obsolete and invalid most of the discriminatory laws that had
previously been allowed. 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“[C]lassifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
107. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–03 (2012) (explaining Hines).
108. 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
109. Id. at 59.
110. Plaintiffs argued that the state law violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 16
of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, exceeded Pennsylvania’s constitutional power absent
congressional consent, and was precluded by the comprehensive federal alien registration
scheme. Id. at 61 & n.7 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144)
(reciting Section 16 in its entirety). The Solicitor General’s amicus brief on behalf of the United
States supported plaintiffs’ argument that the Pennsylvania statute was invalid under Section 16
of the 1870 Civil Rights Act. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 43–49, Hines, 312 U.S. 52 (No. 22).
111. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.
112. Id. at 74.
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writing, conducted “an examination of congressional enactments” to
determine whether Congress has “acted in such matter” as to
113
preclude enforcement of the state law. That in turn caused the Court
to assess Congress’s “broad and comprehensive plan” for alien
114
admission, citizenship, and deportation.
And that assessment
incorporated the values reflected in treaty obligations and, separately,
the protections of equality guaranteed by “[o]ur Constitution and our
115
Civil Rights Act.”
The Hines Court understood the 1870 Civil Rights Act as
reflecting a non-discrimination mandate that, along with other
sources of federal law, contributed to a “comprehensive scheme” for
the treatment of aliens that preempted inconsistent state laws. Thus,
while declining to find that Pennsylvania’s law transgressed Section 16
directly, the Court nonetheless relied on the Civil Rights Act when it
identified the umbrella of federal interests that preempted state
statutes. The Court recognized the 1870 Civil Rights Act as important
to defining the federal structure that governed the treatment of
immigrants and as part of the overall legislative framework adopted
by Congress setting the terms and conditions that govern aliens in the
116
United States. Hines thus reflects an immigrant equality principle in
the context of preempting state laws.
Hines also relied on the foreign affairs power as a source of the
federal government’s immigration authority. The Court explained the
importance of federal primacy and the implications for foreign affairs
and international relations if states were allowed to impose
117
discriminatory burdens on aliens. The interference with national
interests stemming from “real or imagined wrongs” to another
nation’s subjects could precipitate international tensions and
118
reciprocal mistreatment that were matters of “national moment.”
The threatened mistreatment of foreign nationals was part of
Justice Black’s broader theme that placed emphasis on the “rights,
119
liberties and personal freedom of human beings.” He noted that the
danger of laws “singling out aliens as particularly dangerous and

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 69.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
Id.
Id. at 62–74.
Id. at 64, 73.
Id. at 68.
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120

undesirable groups” is “deep-seated in this country.” He expressed
concern throughout the opinion about the manifold ways in which
foreign nationals could be harassed and targeted by “inquisitorial
practices,” “police surveillance,” “injurious discrimination,”
“indiscriminate and repeated interception,” “interrogation by public
officials,” “irritating restrictions upon personal liberties,” and
121
“indiscriminate questioning.”
Black’s discussion of preemption
recognized the equality rights and liberty interests of the immigrants
themselves that underscores the immigrant equality element of
122
federal law.
Soon after Hines, the Court decided Takahashi v. California Fish
& Game Commission, in which Section 16 also contributed to the
123
invalidation of a state law targeting Japanese immigrants. Takahashi
considered a World War II-era law, first enacted by California in 1943
during the period of Japanese-American internment, prohibiting
124
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to any “alien Japanese.” In
1945 the law was amended to remove the explicit reference to the
125
Japanese and to bar instead any “person ineligible to citizenship.”
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id. at 65–66, 71, 74.
122. Id. at 70. Judith Resnik explains that Black’s holding is imbedded in a discussion of
“constituting American identity by limiting the power of the government to interfere with
‘personal liberties.’” See Judith Resnik, Bordering by Law: The Migration of Law, Crimes,
Sovereignty, and the Mail, (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 23, 30) (on file with author)
(tracking the Hines Court’s discussion of public registration laws as “at war with fundamental
principles of our free government,” and characterizing the opinion as “reject[ing] adding public
stigmatization as a facet of the government alien-relationship” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
123. 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
124. Id. at 413. The law at issue in Takahashi was a transparent anti-Japanese statute. See
id. at 426–27 (Murphy, J., concurring). The legislative history documented an amendment to the
statute to make it appear less overtly race-based. Id. at 425–26 (discussing the legislative
history).
125. Id. at 425. At that time, the Japanese remained ineligible to naturalize. Id. at 412 & n.1.
See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 665 n.20 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (estimating
that “[o]f the 48,158 aliens ineligible for naturalization [in the continental United States], 47,305
were Japanese, 749 were Korean, 9 were Polynesian, and 95 belonged to other Asiatic groups”
(citing the 1940 United States Census)). This situation arose from the 1790 Act, which restricted
naturalization eligibility to “free white person[s].” Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103,
103. A Reconstruction-era amendment extended eligibility to “persons of African descent.” Act
of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. For many years only “whites” and persons of
African origin or descent were eligible for naturalization. Substantial litigation concerned which
persons could be considered “white.” See, e.g., United States v. Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206,
215 (1923) (holding that a “Hindu” person is not white); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178,
198 (1922) (holding that a Japanese person is not white). See generally John Tehranian, Note,
Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in
America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000) (discussing litigation concerning the “whiteness” of various
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Takahashi was denied a license in 1945 under that law.
127
The California Supreme Court upheld the restriction, and the
Supreme Court granted review to consider both “federal-state
128
relationships” and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court appeared
prepared to invalidate the restriction on Fourteenth Amendment
129
grounds. However, that reasoning presented potential difficulties
because it could cast doubt on a line of cases allowing state
restrictions against aliens based on the “special public interest”
130
rationale on which California relied. The Court avoided dismantling
the public interest exception by deciding (in conclusory fashion at the
end of the opinion) that the state’s defense did not apply because
California could not claim a sufficient “ownership” interest of fish
within a three-mile coastal zone to justify exclusion of alien fishers
131
under the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, the Court did not place

racial groups and legal methodologies of race). In 1919 and 1924, Congress granted citizenship
to certain American Indians. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 232, 43 Stat. 253 (granting citizenship to
certain American Indians born in the United States); Act of Nov. 6, 1919, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350
(granting citizenship to American Indians who served in the armed forces during World War I).
A 1940 Act provided for naturalization of “descendants of races indigenous to the Western
Hemisphere,” Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140, which was meant to
extend to all American Indians, Charles Gordon, The Racial Barrier to American Citizenship, 93
U. PA. L. REV. 237, 239 (1945). Upon repealing the Chinese exclusion laws, Congress added
persons of Chinese origin or descent to the list of racial groups eligible to naturalize in 1943. Act
of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600, 600. In 1946, Filipinos and “persons of races
indigenous to India” became eligible for citizenship. Luce-Celler Act, ch. 534, 60 Stat. 416
(1946). See generally Gerald E. Cronin, Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 7 U. DET. L.J.
105, 120–22 (1948) (describing the progression of case law and legislation in naturalization).
Racial restrictions on naturalization were finally eliminated in 1952. See generally Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163; CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 94.01(2).
126. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 414.
127. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 30 Cal. 2d 719 (1947), rev’d, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
The state court ruled that “in furtherance of its declared public policy to prohibit ineligible
aliens from taking its animals ferae naturae,” California could permissibly refuse to issue fishing
licenses to ineligible aliens. Id. at 736–37.
128. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 415.
129. Id. at 415–16.
130. Id. at 417. Takahashi also cited Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), for the “special
public interest” doctrine, which in turn cited Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145–46
(1914). See Patsone, 232 U.S. at 145–46 (upholding a statute prohibiting aliens from owning guns
for purposes other than defense of self or property because states have the right to prohibit
noncitizens from hunting their wild game); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340–41 (1901)
(holding that states may restrict aliens’ inheritance rights in the absence of a treaty); Hauenstein
v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1879) (holding that states may make laws restricting the rights of
aliens to hold real property); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 397 (1876) (holding that a state
can reserve the right to plant oysters in its riverbanks to citizens of the state).
131. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 421 (finding that “‘ownership’ is inadequate to justify California
in excluding any or all aliens” lawfully in the state from fishing in coastal waters).
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exclusive reliance on a robust view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
proscriptions. Rather, the Court began with a lengthy discussion of
federal law and federal interests. It focused on the federal
government’s broad constitutional powers over the admission and
132
133
regulation of aliens as well as the protections of the 1870 Act.
Takahashi underscored that states can neither “add to nor take
from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress on admission,
134
naturalization and residence.”
The Court explained that
“discriminatory burdens” on entrance or residence of aliens lawfully
within the United States “conflict with th[e] constitutionally derived
135
federal power to regulate immigration” and are invalid.
However, and importantly, Takahashi did not rest exclusively on
the federal power to regulate admission and expulsion of aliens.
Takahashi—in an opinion again authored by Justice Black—also
emphasized the affirmative prohibition against discrimination
136
embodied in Section 16 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act. The Court
conceptualized this anti-discrimination protection as centrally within
Congress’s enactment of a “comprehensive legislative plan for the
nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and
137
naturalization.” Like Yick Wo, Takahashi quotes the text of Section
138
16 in its entirety and affirms its protection for aliens. The Court thus
recognized that the congressional scheme encompassed both the
132. Id. at 419 (“The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining
what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of
their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.” (citing
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941))).
133. Id. at 419–20.
134. Id. In Takahashi, as well as in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)—a case Takahashi
cites prominently—the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis is infused with concern over
state interference with federal authority in the event a state discriminated against an alien
lawfully admitted to the United States. The Court referred to the protection afforded persons
“lawfully” in the country and denied states power to single out and ban their “lawful” alien
inhabitants. Takahashi, 344 U.S. at 419–20. As I discuss in Part III, infra, these references did
not denude the 1870 Act of its power to preempt state laws that target aliens indiscriminately or
that single out those who are unlawfully in the United States. See infra Part III and text
accompanying notes 180–93.
135. Takahashi, 344 U.S. at 419.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 419 (“Congress, in the enactment of a comprehensive legislative plan for the
nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and naturalization, has broadly provided
[quoting Section 16 in its entirety].” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 41 (1948))).
138. Id. 419 (“The protection of this section has been held to extend to aliens as well as to
citizens.” (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 696 (1898); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Fraser v. McConway & Torley Co., 82 F. 257 (C.C.D. Penn. 1897); In
re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481, 508–09 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880))).
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immigration control and the immigrant equality strands of
preemption in the “legislative plan” governing immigration and
immigrants.
Takahashi is significant because it further demonstrates that the
Civil Rights Act supports displacing state law to enforce equality even
if the state discrimination does not obviously contradict the equal
protection safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Takahashi,
the California law teetered on the edge of Equal Protection
vulnerability and the Court invoked Section 16 to buttress its
139
analysis. The Court emphasized that the California statute was
140
contrary to federal law, including the Civil Rights Act of 1870.
Second, and notable for the contemporary debate, California tried
to defend its law by arguing that it should be permitted to single out
Japanese non-citizens because they were subject to discrimination and
disabilities under federal law. The State urged that it was “simply
141
follow[ing] the Federal Government’s lead” and “adopting [the]
142
classification from the naturalization laws.” The Takahashi Court
139. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 417–18. As Justice Brennan explained for the Court in Toll v.
Moreno: “While pre-emption played a significant role in the Court’s analysis in Takahashi, the
actual basis for invalidation of the California statute was apparently the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.” 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982). Brennan emphasized, however, that
“many of the Court’s decisions concerning alienage classifications, such as Takahashi, are better
explained in pre-emption than in equal protection terms.” Id. (citing Michael J. Perry, Modern
Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–65 (1979);
David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 1069 (1979)).
140. In some cases, where under existing doctrine the Equal Protection Clause does not
clearly bar a state statute because strict scrutiny may not apply, the equality element of
preemption plays a paramount role. Hiroshi Motomura more ambitiously suggests that Equal
Protection itself should limit state immigration enforcement laws targeting undocumented
immigrants on the ground that such statutes may lead to discrimination. See generally
Motomura, supra note 9, at 2063–65; Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims
and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1742–44 (2010). The preemption
framework I advance here should strengthen Motomura’s claim by providing historical and
normative support for an anti-discrimination principle derived from federal law and applicable
broadly to protect all non-citizens.
141. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 418.
142. Id. California’s claim thus echoed contemporary “mirror image” arguments asserting
that states should be permitted to penalize aliens disfavored under federal law by “mirroring”
the federal classification. See Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and
Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 465, 475–77 (2008)
(arguing that the “mirror image” is an area where states can act constitutionally in the field of
immigration). As I explain elsewhere, that theory lost any claim to legitimacy after Arizona v.
United States. Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 35–42. Takahashi’s
rejection of California’s arguments was underscored in Toll v. Moreno when Justice Rehnquist
in dissent unsuccessfully sought to recast the Takahashi decision to permit state laws disfavoring
some non-citizens so long as the law in question was consistent with federal immigration
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rejected that justification as inconsistent with both the Fourteenth
143
Amendment and the laws “adopted under its authority.” The Court
stressed again that Section 16 “extends to aliens as well as to
144
citizens,” and, importantly, that the law protects “‘all persons’
against state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because
145
of alienage or color.”
Finally, in Graham v. Richardson the Court discussed the equalitybased preemption principle more expansively. Graham concerned
state welfare statutes from Arizona and Pennsylvania imposing
discriminatory restrictions on immigrant eligibility for state benefits
146
programs. The Court held that the restrictions violated the Equal
147
Protection Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment ruling marked a sea
148
change in equal protection doctrine, establishing alienage as a
suspect classification and subjecting state immigration classifications

criteria. See 458 U.S. at 27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court rejected that assertion. Id. at
11 (“We rejected the argument [in Takahashi that the state had ‘simply followed the Federal
Government’s lead’] stressing the delicate nature of the federal-state relationship in regulating
aliens . . . .”).
143. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420. See also id. at 419 (“It does not follow . . . that because the
United States regulates immigration and naturalization in part on the basis of race and color
classifications, a state can adopt one or more of the same classifications . . . .”); id. at 420 (“[T]he
power of the state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined
within narrow limits.”).
144. Id. at 419.
145. Id. at 420 (emphasis added) (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 344 U.S. 24, 33 (1948)).
146. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366–68 (1971).
147. Id. at 376. Eight Justices joined the Court’s opinion holding that state “alienage”
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 371–72. The Arizona statute limited eligibility
for state disability assistance programs (funded in part by federal grants) to United States
citizens and to legal resident aliens who had resided in the country for at least fifteen years. Id.
at 366–67. The Pennsylvania statute limited eligibility for state welfare benefits (funded entirely
by the state) to United States citizens, excluding all aliens. Id. at 368.
148. Id. at 371–72. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1135, 1164 (1996)
(characterizing Graham as the “modern approach” to equal protection analysis); Levi, supra
note 139, 1069–70 (noting the significance of Graham for equal protection jurisprudence). See
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
161–62 (1980) (calling the application of heightened scrutiny to alienage classifications a
“relatively easy case”). See also id. at 148–49, 151 (tracing the level of scrutiny applied to
alienage classifications). The understanding that state or local laws denying equal rights to
immigrants may violate the Equal Protection Clause under some circumstances predated
Graham. Most notably, after Yick Wo, in Truax v. Raich the Court held that an Arizona law
limiting private employment of aliens violated their equal protection rights. 239 U.S. 33, 43
(1915). But that Equal Protection principle was limited by earlier decisions affirming a “special
public interest” exception, which permitted alienage discrimination by public entities in the
distribution of public goods or contracts. See, e.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 193–94 (1915)
(applying the exception to a statute prohibiting noncitizens from employment on public works).
See supra note 106.

GUTTENTAG 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

36

10/21/2013 9:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

149

to strict scrutiny. This imposed new and insurmountable hurdles for
150
most state restrictions based on alienage.
The equal protection ruling, however, overshadowed Graham’s
second—and independent—holding that the state welfare restrictions
151
were also preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
That portion of the decision is easily overlooked and generally
underappreciated. The Court held that—independent of Equal
Protection—an “additional reason” for invalidating the state laws was
based on the “constitutional scrutiny emerg[ing] from . . . federal-state
152
relations.” The Court determined that the state welfare laws were
invalid as in “conflict with . . . overriding national policies” for several
153
reasons.
Importantly, those reasons were not limited to the
immigration law or federal enforcement power rationale for
preemption (i.e., immigration control). They also included the
immigrant protections enacted by Section 16 reflecting the immigrant
154
equality component of federal law.
To be sure, the Court began by noting the “comprehensive plan
155
for the regulation of immigration and naturalization.” Thus, it
stressed the federal government’s “broad constitutional powers” over

149. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72.
150. After Graham, the Court developed the “political function” exception to acknowledge
areas of political self-definition where states could permissibly exclude non-citizens. See Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1978) (holding the exception applicable to a statute barring
aliens from becoming state troopers); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1973)
(establishing the “political function” exception).
151. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376–77 (“An additional reason why the state statutes do not
withstand constitutional scrutiny emerges from the area of federal-state relations.”). Justice
Harlan joined only the preemption holding. Id. at 383 (Harlan, J., joining in part and in
judgment). Considerable scholarship addresses the role of equal protection versus preemption
rationales in immigration federalism cases. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, From Graham to
Bernal: Justice Blackmun’s Equal Protection Theory of Aliens’ Rights, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 52,
58–60 (1985) (discussing Graham’s dual equal protection and preemption holdings); Perry,
supra note 139, 1060–64 (arguing that the Court’s immigration federalism jurisprudence is better
explained as preemption than equal protection); Levi, supra note 139, at 1070 (arguing that
Graham and other immigration federalism cases “follow[] an unarticulated theory of
preemption”).
152. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376–77.
153. Id. at 378 (“State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely
because of their alienage conflict with these overriding policies in an area constitutionally
entrusted to the Federal Government.”).
154. Id. at 377.
155. Id. The Court stated that immigration regulation was “constitutionally entrusted” to
the federal government. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). But see Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–15 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that states possess some
authority to regulate immigration).
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aliens’ admission, duration of stay, conditions on residency, and
156
naturalization.
The
opinion
elaborated
on
Congress’s
“comprehensive plan” enumerating the grounds of exclusion (i.e.,
denial of entry at the border) and deportation (i.e., expulsion after
entering or being admitted) that concern indigency, poverty, or the
157
likelihood of becoming a “public charge.” Reasoning by inference,
the Court stressed that “Congress has not seen fit to impose any
burden or restriction on aliens who become indigent after their entry
158
into the United States.” Thus, the state prohibitions were not
enforcing federal immigration restrictions.
However, after laying out those rationales derived from the
immigration regulation and control dimension of federal law, Graham
159
pivoted to the anti-discrimination mandate of Section 16. After
160
quoting it at length, the Court emphasized that “[t]he protection of
this statute” had long been held “to extend to aliens as well as to
161
citizens,” and declared that state laws are limited by broadlyconceived “overriding national policies” that regulate immigrants and
162
protect them against discrimination.
Graham reinforces the understanding that the Civil Rights Act
embodies a transcendent federal principle prohibiting discrimination
based on alienage. In earlier cases, like Yick Wo and Takahashi, issues
of alienage discrimination had been conjoined with hostility based on
163
race and ethnicity. Hence the pure alienage non-discrimination
mandate of Section 16 may not have been operating alone. In Graham
156. Graham, 403 U.S. at 377 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410,
419 (1948)). Among the cases the Court cites are the canonical sources of the federal “plenary
power.” See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The Court also cites two essential preemption cases: Takahashi and
Hines.
157. Graham, 403 U.S. at 377.
158. Id.
159. Id. By then the provision was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
160. Id. (“[Congress] has broadly declared: ‘All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981)).
161. Id. (citing Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419); see also id. at 378 (“[A]liens lawfully within this
country have a right to enter and abide in any State in the Union ‘on an equality of legal
privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws.’” (quoting Takahashi, 334 U.S. at
420)).
162. Id. at 378 (“State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely
because of their alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”).
163. Yick Wo targeted Chinese immigrants and Takahashi singled out Japanese. See supra
text accompanying notes 97 and 124.
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there was no discernible racial component, and the Court rejected the
Pennsylvania and Arizona laws without any reference to race or
nationality. Graham invoked the Civil Rights Act equality principle to
show inconsistency with the “comprehensive [federal] plan” where
the state discrimination was purely on the basis of alienage without
any need to find immigration status serving as a proxy for ethnic or
race-based animosity.
Critically, the Court in Graham recognized that Section 16’s nondiscrimination mandate is an important element of the federal
framework that defines “the overriding national policies” limiting
164
state autonomy. The Court employed an encompassing view of the
federal laws and purposes that constitute the federal structure
governing—and protecting—immigrants. The decision rested not just
on the laws relating to admission and expulsion but also on the civil
rights command of equality for non-citizens. The Court’s analysis
stands unmistakably for the principle that the preemptive force of
federal law derives not just from immigration-control statutes that
regulate the admission, expulsion, and residence of non-citizens;
preemption also enforces the prohibitions against discrimination
originating in the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Graham’s preemption
analysis effectuated both the immigration control and the immigrant
equality ground. The two in tandem comprise the federal policies
against which state restrictions must be measured.
* * *
After Graham, the Court’s resolution of challenges to state
alienage classifications has turned almost exclusively on whether the
165
restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court
decided only two immigration cases on federal preemption grounds
166
167
between 1971 and 2011. One, DeCanas v. Bica, held that a state

164. Graham, 403 U.S. at 378.
165. The Court decided numerous cases that applied strict scrutiny and that articulated the
“political function” exception to heightened scrutiny of state classifications. See supra note 150.
See also Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 4 n.12 (collecting post-Graham
cases addressing state alienage restrictions).
166. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 4, 17 (1982) (holding a university policy denying certain
aliens in-state status preempted by federal immigration laws); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
352, 356 (1976) (upholding a California statute penalizing employers for knowingly hiring illegal
aliens as an exercise of traditional state power); see also Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S.
265, 282–83 (1977) (holding a Virginia statute restricting fishing licenses based on citizenship
preempted by the Enrollment and Licensing Act and the federal scheme of fishing licensing and
regulation).
167. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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alien employment regulation was within the state’s historic police
powers and, moreover, implicitly authorized by federal law, thus
168
169
rejecting the federal preemption claim. The other, Toll v. Moreno,
found that the state policy denying equal access to in-state tuition to
certain “non-immigrant” foreign nationals temporarily residing in the
country was inconsistent with their treatment under federal
immigration (and other) laws, though the Court did not expressly rely
170
on or invoke the Civil Rights Act.
The Court did not hear another immigration preemption case
171
until Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting. By then Section 16 and the
equality principle it embodied had not been cited by the Court in an
172
immigration case for nearly forty years. Today, equality-based
168. In DeCanas, a state law penalized agricultural employers who hired immigrant workers
not lawfully eligible to work under federal law. Id. at 359–61. The Court upheld the employer
sanctions law as not categorically prohibited on field preemption grounds and as falling within
the traditional powers of the state in a realm in which the federal government exhibited only
peripheral concern with immigrant employment. Id. at 365. The case was remanded for
consideration of conflict preemption. Id. at 360. No reference to the 1870 Act appears in that
decision. The role that this protection should play in the DeCanas setting, had the Court
considered it, is complex. In Toll v. Moreno, the Court explained that federal law affirmatively
authorized the California statute upheld in DeCanas. 458 U.S. 1, 47 n.18 (1982). On that
reading, the state law would presumably not be preempted. Had the Court engaged in a broad
canvassing of the applicable federal law, it should have considered the effect of the nondiscrimination rule reflected in Section 16 and whether the California statute posed a threat of
discrimination either in the Court’s field preemption ruling or as encompassed within the
remand for conflict preemption.
169. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
170. The Court invalidated a state tuition policy denying in-state tuition rates to certain
non-immigrant visa holders as conflicting with federal law. Id. at 4, 17. The Court quoted
Takahashi at length, id. at 11, read it as an equal protection case with significant preemption
elements, id. at 12, and referred elliptically to its passages implicating Section 16 without
directly citing them, id. at 12–13. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist sparred over the proper
reading of Takahashi, with the majority rejecting Rehnquist’s view. See supra note 142.
171. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). See Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 4–7
(discussing and enumerating alienage discrimination cases after Takahashi until Arizona).
172. During that period, lower courts disagreed over the reach of § 1981’s application to
private conduct, including private alienage discrimination. After the Supreme Court held that §
1981 applied to private race discrimination, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 169–70 (1976)
(holding that § 1981 prohibits private race discrimination), the lower courts took up the issue of
whether private alienage discrimination was also prohibited, see Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of
Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343, 1351–42 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that § 1981 does not reach private
alienage discrimination committed under color of state law); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653–54 (5th Cir.1974) (holding that § 1981 reaches private alienage
discrimination). See also Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036, 1043 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that §
1981 prohibited private alienage discrimination). The issue was rendered moot by a 1991
amendment to § 1981 that added explicit language covering private conduct. See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (“The rights protected by this
section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment
under color of State law.”); Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
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concerns appear reserved for Equal Protection claims, and
preemption has become defined by immigration enforcement and
regulation considerations. As the Court begins to grapple with
contemporary sub-federal laws and to elaborate the scope and
purposes of the federal framework regulating and protecting foreign
nationals in the United States, the immigrant equality protection
spawned by the Civil Rights Act of 1870 has a vital role to play.
III. PREEMPTION AND EQUALITY
The preceding account seeks to show that protecting non-citizens
against sub-federal discrimination was a central and deliberate
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, that the Act constitutes an
essential component of federal policy, and that the Supreme Court
has recognized—and enforced—the Act’s immigrant equality
safeguard in its Supremacy Clause analysis to preempt inconsistent
state laws.
In the contemporary context, revitalizing the equality element of
preemption has important consequences. First, it would oblige courts
to assess whether local immigration measures are inconsistent with
federal civil rights principles. That means preemption would look at
more than the express or implicit limits on local enforcement that
might be present in federal immigration control law; preemption
would properly be concerned as well with the discriminatory
consequences of state and local measures.
Second, the immigrant equality component of federal law
illuminates a fundamental distinction between two types of
contemporary local laws based on whether they advance or retard the
equality of non-citizens. Local measures that further equality and
reduce discrimination—i.e., immigrant-friendly (or so-called
“sanctuary”) laws—find affirmative support in the federal framework.
In contrast, local laws that diminish equality or engender
discrimination are at odds with federal equality goals. Immigrant
equality is a federal objective rooted in congressional enactments that
differentiates among categories of local immigration laws and
§ 1981 prohibited private alienage discrimination, “at least” since the 1991 Act). The 1991
amendment also resolved other disagreements about the scope of § 1981’s substantive
protections. See generally CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008)
(explaining that the 1991 Act superseded the holding of Patterson v. McLean, 491 U.S. 164
(1989) and other cases in which the Court found that § 1981 did not cover post-hiring
discrimination). See supra note 94.
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ordinances.
A. Enforcing Non-Discrimination
The value the federal statutory scheme places on
non-discrimination means that courts considering preemption should
scrutinize whether state immigration laws cause discrimination
against immigrants in addition to whether they constitute
impermissible enforcement mechanisms. The immigration control
approach adopted in Arizona asks whether a state law or practice
exceeds the enforcement authority delegated to the state and whether
it pierces a functional ceiling on the enforcement methods authorized
by federal law. The immigrant equality component would also inquire
into the danger of immigration discrimination that a state law poses.
For example, in Arizona, the Court’s assessment of Section 2B’s
“show me your papers” law focused on whether the state detention
and verification scheme might exceed federal enforcement
authorization. Because the Court found that federal law required the
Law Enforcement Support Center to respond to state inquiries about
immigration status, the Court found no clear inconsistency between
173
Section 2B’s mandated inquiry and the federal enforcement scheme.
174
The Court thus rejected a facial preemption claim. Though alluding
to discrimination concerns, the Court did not evaluate Section 2B
against an affirmative federal non-discrimination requirement. If
immigrant equality were acknowledged as a core value of federal law,
evidence that Section 2B increases the danger of profiling or
discrimination would properly be part of the preemption analysis
175
rather than be marginalized as an entirely distinct claim.

173. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508 (2012).
174. Id. As I have noted elsewhere, the Court imposed significant limits on Section 2B.
Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 13–15.
175. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, contemporary measures that single out or stigmatize
176
non-citizens seeking access to the civil or criminal justice system,
177
restrict eligibility for housing based on immigration status, or
178
would be
impede immigrants’ attendance at public schools
vulnerable to preemption under the immigrant equality prong.
Although such enforcement measures may also be invalid under the
Arizona immigration control paradigm, that framework is not the
only basis for determining congressional objectives and the scope of
preemption. Some state laws that oblige local officials to transmit
certain immigration information to federal agencies may be thought
to fit within the permissible immigration control ceiling. They may
appear congruent with federal information-sharing policies and may
not implicate the prolonged or uninvited police detention that
Arizona disapproved. But such laws may nonetheless single out
immigrants for separate treatment, impose discriminatory burdens, or
encourage disparate effects. State immigration enforcement laws that
generate ethnic stereotyping or incentivize racial profiling would be
179
inconsistent with federal non-discrimination values. Preemption
should take into account the law’s interference with the federal
purpose of immigrant equality.

176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-32 (2012) (requiring the name of an “unlawfully present
alien” who is detained by law enforcement and appears in state court to be posted). The
provision is the subject of litigation. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Doe
v. Hobson, No. 2:13-cv-00079-WKW-CSC (M.D. Ala. Feb 7, 2013).
177. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2013 WL 3855549, *1 (3d Cir. July
26, 2013) (holding a city ordinance that attempted to regulate “the provision of rental housing to
aliens lacking lawful immigration status” within the city preempted by federal law), and Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL 3791664, *1–2 (5th Cir.
July 22, 2013) (holding a city ordinance that sought to bar non-citizens “not lawfully present in
the United States” from renting housing in the city preempted by federal law), with Keller v.
City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 937–38 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding a city ordinance that made it
unlawful to rent, or permit occupancy by, an “alien not lawfully present in the United States”
within the city not preempted by federal law).
178. See Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Governor of Ala. (HICA), 691 F.3d 1236, 1244–50 (11th
Cir. 2012) (remanding for injunction against ALA. CODE § 31-13-27, which required Alabama
education officials to collect data about the alienage of public K-12 students and their parents).
See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (holding that discrimination against
undocumented children in K-12 public school is subject to heightened scrutiny).
179. This Article does not attempt an exhaustive survey of current or potential state and
local measures. My goal is to broaden the framework for preemption analysis of sub-federal
laws. Whether any particular state or local law or policy is actually preempted necessarily turns
on a careful reading of the specific state measure and federal provisions at issue.
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The fact that laws like SB 1070 purport to target only
undocumented immigrants does not negate the non-discrimination
command of the Civil Rights Act as an essential element of
preemption. To be sure, the Court’s earlier cases invoking Section 16
as part of the federal framework often focused on the “lawful” status
180
of the immigrants affected by sub-federal laws. But equality retains
its force as a goal of federal law—even if states claim to single out
only those who are not lawful or documented.
That is the case because, among other reasons, laws that purport to
focus on unauthorized aliens typically encourage scrutiny based on
suspicion of undocumented status. This inevitably ensnares many
lawful residents and citizens who share the assumed or stereotypical
181
traits of suspected undocumented immigrants. More fundamentally,
Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 are broad in their
coverage and neither distinguishes between lawfully and unlawfully
present immigrants. Section 16 applies to “all persons” and ensures
182
their equality with “citizens” in “every State and Territory.” Section
17 outlaws subjecting individuals to differential treatment or
183
punishment on account of “being an alien.” There is no textual
limitation or suggestion that only some aliens are protected and that
others may be subjected to differential state sanctions or
184
punishments. When Yick Wo first confronted the 1870 Act (along
with the text and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment), the Court
180. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
181. Considering the impact on lawful immigrants for preemption purposes is distinct from
whether § 1981 would itself be directly violated by an ordinance that lacks the requisite
discriminatory purpose. The Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires a showing of
purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989)
(noting that § 1981 requires a showing of “purposeful discrimination”). Even if one assumed
that only lawful aliens were protected by § 1981, which is contrary to the text, that would not
answer the broader question of whether a local ordinance aimed only at undocumented
immigrants that demonstrably precipitates or raises the danger of alienage discrimination—even
if not purposeful—against lawful residents (through ethnic profiling or by other means)
nonetheless interferes with federal policy or constitutes an obstacle to a federal goal.
182. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
183. Id. § 17.
184. The lower courts have applied Section 17’s protections generally to undocumented
aliens. See United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 243–44 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 although the victim was an “illegal alien”). The term
“inhabitant” may not have had as broad a scope (before it was amended to “persons”), but that
term did not turn on an alien's immigration status under federal law. See United States v.
Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 227–28 (1st Cir. 1990) (overturning a conviction where the alleged
victim was a temporary visitor, though acknowledging that “[w]e can understand how one might
bring an ‘illegal alien,’ intending to stay in the country for some time, within the scope of the
word ‘inhabitant’”). See also supra note 66.
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emphasized that the protection applied to all—including “aliens and
185
subjects of the Emperor of China” —and that it mandated an
equality of rights between citizens and those of “strangers and
186
aliens.”
Some might argue that the 1870 Act (and the language of Yick
Wo) should not apply fully when states target undocumented
immigrants because the Act predates the major federal immigration
regulation adopted in 1875 and thereafter. Hence, the argument
contends, Congress could not have intended to protect aliens who
were in the country in violation of federal law. This fails to grapple
with the broader effect on immigrant equality of laws even when they
formalistically target only some non-citizens. The argument also fails
to recognize the existence of some federal immigration regulation at
the time of the 1870 Act (and extensive regulation by the time of Yick
Wo). Federal legislation prohibited entry of some foreigners as early
187
as 1862—before passage of the 1870 Civil Rights Act. The Act’s
reference to “all persons” would, by its plain language, apply to
persons present in the United States in violation of any earlier
188
restrictions.
185. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
186. Id. at 369.
187. For example, as commentators have noted, 1862 legislation prohibited the importation
of “Coolies” from China and 1869 legislation extended the restriction to Japan and other Asian
countries. See supra note 78. Many commentators understand the 1862 Act as a regulation of
immigration. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative
State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002) (“[The Act] was intended to prevent the
importation of ‘Coolies’ . . . .”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1, 114 (2002) (“Anti-Chinese sentiment also was prevalent at the national level. In
1862, Congress prohibited involuntary Asian immigration, and the 1875 Page Act again barred
involuntary ‘Oriental’ laborers, as well as convicts and prostitutes.”); Renee C. Redman, From
Importation of Slaves to Migration of Laborers: The Struggle to Outlaw American Participation
in the Chinese Coolie Trade and the Seeds of United States Immigration Law, 3 ALB. GOV'T L.
REV. 1, 49 (2010) (“[The [1875] Law was not the first federal law to regulate immigration. It
amended the Coolie Trade Prohibition Act, of February 19, 1862 . . . .”). See also Arizona v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 2492, 2513 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Kerry Abrams,
Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641,
668–69 (2005) (arguing that the 1862 Act was intended to prohibit American involvement in the
slave trade, not to restrict immigration). Further, as Gerald Neuman has shown, states too had
enacted laws regulating the entry of persons into states and their right to remain once present.
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833,
1901 (1993). He explains that persons considered illegally present under state law would appear
to have been understood to be “an illegal immigrant to the United States.” Id.
188. Of course, by the time of Yick Wo in 1886 Congress had enacted the major
immigration regulation and restriction laws of 1875 and 1882. See generally E.P. HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965 46 (1981) (“The
complaints about the coming of foreign paupers, criminals, and other undesirables, long familiar
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It also bears recalling that Chinese immigrants of the midnineteenth century were the most disfavored and stigmatized
category of non-citizens under federal law. The Chinese were subject
189
to pernicious and discriminatory exclusion and deportation laws,
190
were barred from the polity and ineligible for naturalization, were
threatened with perpetual non-citizenship until the Supreme Court
191
intervened in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, and were treated as
192
disreputable and untrustworthy under federal law. Yet, Congress
granted them a measure of civil rights equality and protection by
consciously sweeping them into the scope of an historic and enduring
Civil Rights Acts that denied states the authority to “follow the lead”
193
of federal law. Federal disfavor or disability does not authorize state
discrimination.
B. Advancing Equality
Recognizing the immigrant equality element of federal law also
suggests an important conceptual difference between local measures
that seek to further immigrant equality and those that seek to enforce
immigration status violations.
Laws that support immigrant equality or integration should be
understood as affirmatively furthering the anti-discrimination,
immigrant-equality purposes of federal law. These local measures may,
for example, instruct local police departments not to gather
immigration information or not to enforce immigration status
194
violations; they may provide equal eligibility for in-state tuition at
to the colonial and state governments, were repeatedly heard in Congress.”). My point is not
that the 1870 Civil Rights Act necessarily outlaws all classifications against any category of noncitizens. Rather, it is that the non-discrimination requirement of the Civil Rights Act cannot be
discarded as a factor in preemption analysis simply because a state law claims to target only
immigrants present without federal permission.
189. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724–28 (1893); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889).
190. See supra note 125.
191. 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
192. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727 (requiring a non-Chinese, white witness to prove
eligibility for a residence certificate).
193. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., HARTFORD, CONN., MUNI. CODE ch. 2, art. 21 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §
181.850(1) (2011) (stating that law enforcement agencies and political subdivisions shall not
“use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or apprehending
persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the
United States in violation of federal immigration laws”); Milwaukee, Wis., General Order 200803 (eff. Aug. 26, 2008); Virginia Beach, Va., Operational General Order 11.10 (eff. May 1,
2007); New Haven, Conn., General Order 06-2 (eff. Dec. 21, 2006); Seattle, Wash., Directive 03-
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195

public colleges for all state residents; authorize drivers licenses to
196
every qualifying driver; allow law school graduates who pass the bar
197
to be licensed as attorneys regardless of immigration status; or
establish universal municipal identity documents available to every
198
city resident.
57 (eff. 2002). By and large, these orders allow local police to inquire into immigration status
only after an individual has been arrested for a serious crime or in the course of a criminal
investigation.
195. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 68130.5 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10a-29(9) (West 2013). Fourteen states have clear policies allowing undocumented immigrants
to pay in-state tuition at state institutions of higher education. Twelve states have statutes
allowing anyone graduating from a state high school to claim in-state tuition: Texas, California,
Utah, New York, Washington, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Maryland,
and Connecticut. Rhode Island has a policy allowing undocumented immigrants to claim instate tuition enacted by its Board of Governors for Higher Education. Maryland passed a law
allowing for in-state tuition for undocumented students as long as they meet certain
requirements. In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/in-statetuition-and-unauthorized-immigrants.aspx (last updated Nov. 28, 2012). In addition, Oklahoma
previously had a law allowing for in-state tuition. That law was repealed in 2008, but the
Oklahoma State Regents still has the power to enroll a student if he or she meets certain
criteria. Map of States with In-State Tuition Laws, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa
.com/content/learn/dream-act/map-states-state-tuition-laws.html (“[T]he new law allows the
state’s Board of Regents to award in-state tuition to illegal aliens who have attended an
Oklahoma high school for at least two years and graduated. They must also sign an affidavit
[stating] that they are trying to legalize their status or will do so . . . .”).
196. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9(B) (West 2013); N.M. CODE. R. § 18.19.5.12(D)
(LexisNexis 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.035(3) (West 2013). In addition, thirty-eight
states issue drivers licenses to individuals receiving deferred action relief under the Obama
administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. See Are
Individuals Granted Deferred Action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER,
http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated Apr. 9, 2013).
197. The California bar, with the Attorney General’s support, is seeking to allow such
licensing, and the issue is currently before both the California and Florida Supreme Courts. See
Steve Bousquet, Florida Supreme Court Considers: Can Immigrant Illegally in U.S. Practice
Law?, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/02/3031618/floridasupreme-court-considers.html; Maura Dolan, California State Bar Argues for Law Licenses for
the Undocumented, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/19/local/lame-immigrant-lawyer-20120619. The docket for In re Sergio C. Garcia on Admission is available
at http://www.courts.ca.gov/18822.htm. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Kamala Harris,
Attorney General of the State of California, In re Garcia, No. S202512 (Cal. July 18, 2012),
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4-s202512-amicus-ca-atty-general-kamalaharris-071812.pdf.
198. At least eight municipalities have some form of municipal ID: Los Angeles, CA; New
Haven, CT; Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; Trenton, NJ; Princeton, NJ; Asbury Park, NY;
Washington, D.C.; and Mercer Co., NJ. Eligibility for drivers’ licenses is in flux. Dan Frosch, A
New Fight on Licenses for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/in-new-mexico-a-fight-anew-over-drivers-licenses-forillegal-immigrants.html; Mary Wisniewski, Illinois May Give Driver’s Licenses to Illegal
Immigrants, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/21/15333584illinois-may-give-drivers-licenses-to-illegal-immigrants?lite.
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These equality-enhancing measures typically function by declining
to inquire into an individual’s immigration status. They are designed
to put all residents on an equal footing for municipal matters by
making immigration distinctions irrelevant for local purposes. The
local laws may be adopted to minimize the risk of racial or ethnic
199
profiling by police or other civil servants, to ensure confidence in
200
community policing, to remove crippling and demoralizing hurdles
that impede young immigrant high-school graduates from accessing
201
educational opportunities, or to facilitate access to libraries, banking
services, and other institutions. Localities may choose such policies to
202
further local interests and public safety.

199. Race, ethnicity, and nationality are typical factors for determining suspicion of alien
status. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975); United States v.
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). For a particularly telling example of
local law enforcement using these factors impermissibly, see Letter from Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y of Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. (Dec. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.
200. See e.g., D.C. Mayor's Order No. 2011-174, 58 D.C. Reg. 009083 (Oct. 19, 2011).
In addition to promoting important community policing goals, assistance from
immigrant populations is especially important when an immigrant, whether
documented or not, is the victim of or witness to a crime. These persons must feel
comfortable in coming forward with information and in filing reports. Their
cooperation is needed to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety,
and security in the entire community. One of our most important goals is to enhance
our relationship with immigrant communities as well as to establish new and ongoing
partnerships consistent with our community policing philosophy.
Id.
201. For example, on signing the Maryland DREAM Act, Governor Martin O’Malley said:
“The more that we do to make the dream of a college education a real opportunity for every
child in Maryland, the stronger that makes Maryland.” Alina Mogilyanskaya, In Md. Voters’
Approval of Dream Act, Hope for Students and Sign for the Nation, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (Nov. 6, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Hope-for-StudentsSign-for/135596/.
202. See, e.g., Statement of Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Police, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20,
2007), available at http://newsroom.dc.gov/show.aspx/agency/mpdc/section/4/release/10998/
year/2007.
Our department is responsible for providing police services to everyone in the District
of Columbia—equally, fairly, and justly. To help carry out that mission, we have
adopted a strategy of community policing—of police and residents working together
to fight crime in a partnership of cooperation, respect, and trust. If some of our
residents are reluctant to interact with police, because they fear we are there to
enforce civil immigration laws, then all hopes for partnership and cooperation are lost,
and what really suffers the most is the safety of entire communities.
Id.
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Such laws—often referred to somewhat misleadingly as
203
“sanctuary” laws —are designed to reduce the salience of
immigration status for local matters. The measures provide that
immigration categories and violations should matter only for required
federal purposes and not for local decisions (unless mandated by
federal law). They decline to apply an immigration-status filter for
participation in municipal affairs, for receipt of local services, or for
access to local benefits. They may seek to limit the involvement of
local entities in sharing immigration information with federal officials
and to distance local officials from federal immigration enforcement
204
to the maximum extent permissible.
This category of local policies is not inconsistent with federal law
and should not be at risk of preemption on grounds applicable to
local enforcement measures. Local governments that reject
consideration of immigration-status distinctions are affirmatively
furthering the principles of non-discrimination and equality that lie at
the heart of the Civil Rights Act. Local or state integration laws
enhance civic participation, reduce the risk of discrimination, and
promote the equality of immigrants in society. The laws are not
merely operating in the interstices of federal immigration
enforcement requirements; rather they are supported by the federal
value of immigrant equality.

203. The term “sanctuary” risks confusion insofar as it suggests affirmative insulation from
or interference with federal enforcement mandates. These ordinances or laws do not afford any
formal protection or “sanctuary” from federal enforcement. Rather, they provide that for state
or local purposes, absent an express federal duty or prohibition, immigration status will not be
pursued or considered. For an excellent cataloguing and discussion of many such laws, see
Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 600–05. The term has no single agreed-upon definition. For a range
of compilations and definitions see Corrie Bilke, Divided We Stand, United We Fall: A Public
Policy Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV.
165, 180 (2009) (discussing the 2006 Congressional Research Service); S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Tom (Tak) Wong, Immigration Policies go Local: The Varying Responses of
Local Governments to Undocumented Immigration 10 (2007), http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/files/RamakrishnanWongpaperfinal.pdf (finding seventy-one “pro-immigrant” or
“sanctuary” ordinances broadly defined). NumbersUSA lists three states—Oregon, Utah, and
Vermont—and 142 localities as having some form of “sanctuary law,” which they define as any
law or policy preventing police from asking about or acting on immigration information in a
variety of circumstances. See Sanctuary Laws, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa.com/
content/learn/national-security/sanctuary-laws.html. See also About Sanctuary Policies,
NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/sanctuarypolicy.html.
204. See generally Kristina A. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid is Never a Crime? The Politics
of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 111–15
(2012); Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
573 (2010).
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This understanding may help address a concern that is sometimes
raised to suggest that tolerance of state immigration enforcement
measures is necessary to also give states the leeway to adopt
immigrant-friendly and immigrant-integration laws. Supporters of
sub-federal immigrant integration policies have suggested that a
strong federal immigration preemption rule may undermine or
eviscerate the capacity of states and localities to welcome immigrants
205
into their communities through positive local initiatives. The
implication is that a robust doctrine of immigration preemption
barring local immigration enforcement laws may be a two-edged
sword that threatens immigrant-protection laws. Under this view, a
presumption in favor of preemption—as I believe Arizona
206
functionally adopts with regard to state enforcement measures —
might be seen (mistakenly) as impeding states’ authority to enact
immigrant-friendly measures.
I believe this worry assumes a narrow conception of preemption
that does not take account of the immigrant equality element of
federal law. Recognition of the equality component means that local
laws advancing immigrant equality are conceptually distinct from laws
that target immigrants for enforcement. Local equality-promoting
measures affirmatively effectuate the federal equality norm of the
Civil Rights Act, whereas state immigration enforcement laws
obstruct or conflict with the anti-discrimination mandate. Robust
preemption of local enforcement initiatives should not diminish a
state’s flexibility to experiment with equality measures that further
immigrant integration.
C. Preventing Harassment
The Civil Rights Act immigrant equality element also finds
support in Arizona’s anti-harassment analysis. The Court’s decision
recognized the federal interest in preventing local harassment of
207
foreign nationals. The basis for that interest is preserving federal

205. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 567 (arguing that courts should adopt a weaker
preemption regime in the immigration context for the purpose of protecting the prerogative of
states and localities to enact policies integrating immigrants). Cf. Pratheepan Gulasekaram &
Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1717 (2009) (expressing potential “hesitation with recognizing the validity
of sanctuary policies under the preemption doctrine” for fear “that allowing inclusionary
measures to survive the preemption doctrine requires similar treatment of exclusionary laws”).
206. Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 34.
207. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
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control over foreign relations. But, like the protection against
discrimination, the concern with harassment is focused on the
potential consequences of local laws. The reason the laws are deemed
inconsistent with federal purposes is that they threaten immigrants
with the risk—not the certainty—of harassment or abuse. In that
respect, preventing harassment is closely related to avoiding
discrimination or furthering equality. All are assessing the threat to
federal values by predicting the potential impact on immigrants, albeit
based on different rationales.
As Arizona explained, the rationale for prohibiting unsanctioned
harassment by local officials is to prevent tensions with other nations
if their nationals are mistreated in the United States and to protect
208
Americans abroad from retaliatory actions by foreign governments.
Prohibiting mistreatment is thus derivative of the interest in
maximizing federal control over matters that touch on foreign
relations. In contrast, the 1870 Act’s foundation for nondiscrimination is based on the interest in protecting non-citizens as
the end in itself.
Nonetheless, both the civil rights and the foreign relations
rationales consider the risk that state laws pose for immigrants. This is
a more encompassing view of the federal interest because it extends
beyond narrowly looking at Congress’s policies on regulating,
punishing, conditioning, or blessing the presence of non-citizens in the
United States under the immigration statutes. In Hines v. Davidowitz,
the anti-discrimination principle of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and
the anti-harassment principle emanating from the foreign affairs
power converged when the Court invoked both to strike down the
209
Pennsylvania registration law.
208. Arizona noted that foreign nationals could be harassed as a consequence of SB 1070.
Id. at 2498. The Court explained that “[p]erceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States
may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.” Id. Central to foreign
relations is “the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals
are in another country.” Id. at 2498–99 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64, (1941)).
The Court found a threat to federal interests in the risk of “unnecessary harassment of some
aliens . . . whom federal officials determine should not be removed.” Id. at 2506.
209. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 62–66 (providing the anti-harassment rationale); id at 69 (“Our
Constitution and our Civil Rights Act have guaranteed to aliens ‘the equal protection of the
laws (which) is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886))); see also supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. The congressional
debates over the alien provisions in the 1870 Act reflect the close relationship between the two
rationales. In advocating for his bill, Senator Stewart cited, among other reasons, the treaty
rights of the Chinese and the duty of the United States to prevent harassment and
discrimination. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658, 3807 (1870). Thus, the federal
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* * *
The federal interest in protecting non-citizens against harassment
and discrimination erect a framework that tilts in favor of state
measures furthering immigrant equality and against measures
increasing immigration discrimination. This suggests that states and
localities may generally (subject to express, permissible federal
prohibitions) elect to disregard immigration status distinctions when
they choose, and may enforce immigration violations only as federal
law affirmatively permits. This, in turn, reflects a federal scheme that
prohibits parochial discrimination and values sub-federal immigrant
equality. States retain latitude to innovate and to foster immigrant
integration within a broad zone consistent with an immigrant-equality
goal. This conception of local autonomy effectuates the “overriding
210
national policies” of the federal scheme.
This is not to suggest that the immigrant equality element of
federal law applies mechanically to permit or preempt state laws
solely depending on whether they are characterized as enforcement
or integration measures—or as “equality” or “discrimination” laws.
Preemption necessarily depends on a careful assessment of the actual
state statute, its intended and likely effects, and the scope of federal
protections, permissions, and prohibitions. My claim is not that the
1870 Act categorically prohibits or allows every kind of state law of
one category or another.
My modest ambition is to demonstrate that immigration
preemption must take account of the overlooked immigrant equality
element that is embedded in federal law. Arizona assertively enforced
the immigration control component of preemption. A fuller reading
of the federal framework should give equal stature and force to the
immigrant equality norm.

prohibition against state discrimination Stewart advanced served both to protect the Chinese
and to fulfill treaty obligations.
210. This does not preclude Congress from expressly legislating (if otherwise within its
allowable powers) to specify what is consistent with and contrary to federal law. But when
congressional purpose is discerned from the broad framework, the immigrant equality norm
acts, at a minimum, as the proverbial thumb on the preemption scale. Cf. Young, supra note 2,
at 274–75 (discussing the general “thumb on the scale” against preemption).
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CONCLUSION
The Supremacy Clause mandates fidelity to federal law over
conflicting state measures. Judicial enforcement requires discerning
congressional purpose to reject state laws that “stand[] as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
211
objectives of Congress.” Defining the federal objectives, though
inevitably disputed and inexact, compels courts to identify the
appropriate federal interest and legislative framework. For
immigration federalism, an assessment of the federal scheme must
look beyond the confines of the immigration statute and immigration
control. Preemption must include the broad immigrant equality goals
embedded in federal law that prohibit state alienage discrimination.
The centrality of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to that endeavor is
demonstrated by the scope of the Act and the Supreme Court’s
recognition of its purpose. As a new generation of state and local
immigration measures become subject to scrutiny under principles of
preemption and federal supremacy, the importance of enforcing
immigrant equality as a core component of federal law grows. The
values that equality embraces provide further grounds for questioning
state immigration enforcement measures while encouraging local
immigrant integration initiatives to flourish.

211. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).

